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Abstract 
  
The precarious existence of Uber drivers operating within Johannesburg’s metropolitan area 
is the primary area of study in which this dissertation has undertaken. Driver precarity, 
defined in the study as the loss of labour market security in various forms, is argued to stem 
from Uber’s sharing economy-inspired business model. The analysis of Uber’s business 
model substantively focuses on the service’s dynamic pricing model of fare price setting, the 
implementation of a ‘rating’ system in which to evaluate driver performance and the use of 
‘independent contractor’ labour. It is argued that each of these three Uber business practices 
place drivers in a position of precarity in the realm of their income, employment, work and 
job security. The study mobilises a qualitative research methodology, enlisting the methods 
of unstructured interviews on eight active Uber drivers, four autoethnographical observations 
on real-time work behaviour and document analysis to generate data for analysis. The 
prevailing argument made regarding Uber’s precarity-creation, is aided through a 
consultation of Guy Standing’s theorisation on precarity (2011), with Harvey’s flexible 
Accumulation theory (1990), Foucault’s Panopticism thesis (1975) and Hochschild’s 
emotional labour theory (1983) broadening the scope of the analysis.   
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Chapter 1 – Uber’s Precarious Labour Force 
 
Prologue 
 
The following ethnographic vignette with a driver named Phillip, encapsulates the typical 
existence of a Uber driver cruising the streets of Johannesburg, South Africa. An existence 
constrained by an implicit precarity, one that stems from the perennial pursuit of earning a 
liveable wage in the face of work instability. 
 
Johannesburg’s mid-summer winds cease to relent as my Uber driver begins to weave 
his Toyota Corolla through the leafy yet mazy corners separating Killarney and 
Saxonwold. Phillip, as it reads on my Uber smartphone application, is my driver for 
the course of the morning. He has an Uber rating of 4.7 out of 5 stars, his clients must 
take to him quite warmly to rate him so highly. ‘Not a problem, not a problem at all’ 
he says when I ask him for a short interview. ‘This is when we must make our money, 
man. People are out and about, especially these young ones you know – Melville, 
Sandton, Braamfontein, those places’ he remarks as I ask him about the relative 
business of Friday’s and weekends. ‘I have to reach target, last month was not so 
good – so I must work more’, ‘targets?’ I exclaim, ‘My boss expects at least one-
point-one on weekends’ he explains with the crescendo in his voice waning. I lament 
on Phillip’s assertion, and one resounding word kept playing itself out – targets. 
Phillip explained that he was currently driving a car that belonged to someone else. 
We will call him or her the ‘fleet owner’. ‘Maybe I will knock off around two or three 
in the morning’ he explains, astounding considering it wasn’t even 9am in Africa’s 
tumultuous metropolis. Uber champions ‘being your own boss’ on its website, 
promoting self-management and flexible work hours depending on one’s taste. For 
Phillip however, this was the start of a nineteen-hour target chase, balancing the 
horizon of R1,100 for his fleet owner with whatever amount comes after that, an 
amount he will live on.  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The 21st century has seen the world experience a vast socio-economic evolution due to the 
rise of technology and the internet. Manual Castells’ theorisation of ‘The Network Society’, 
explains how technology is the new axis in which a new form of social organisation based on 
networking is emerging, through the diffusion of networking in all realms of activity based 
on digital communication (Castells & Cardoso, 2005). This new form of social organisation 
that Castells refers to is perhaps best encapsulated through the birth of the ‘sharing economy’. 
A platform for private buyers and sellers of products and services to interact and transact 
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online, the sharing economy has reformed traditional ideas of established industry norms and 
practices (Hamari, 2014). These industry reforms that have been enacted by the sharing 
economy have chiefly been carried out through what Harvard Professor Clayton Christensen 
termed as ‘disruptive technology’ (Christensen, 1997). Disruptive technologies can be 
characterised as products that disrupt and eventually displace existing industry competitors 
due to an increased efficiency of service and lower cost due to technological innovation 
(ibid). Examples of disruptive technologies are found in companies such as Airbnb, Ebay and 
Uber. Airbnb, a platform where anyone can lease their home or private space online, has 
disrupted the traditional hotel industry primarily through lower-price points for rooms and 
heightened user convenience. Ebay, an online platform for the sale and leasing of 
miscellaneous household products, has shaken the department store sector in the same 
fashion, allowing users to skip store walk-ins and trade directly with one another online. 
Peers have been connected through the Internet and technology, mediated through the sharing 
economy. As a result, labour has either been culled or reconfigured while industries have 
been intrinsically modified. Travel agents and store shelve isles have been replaced by 
websites, online user recommendations and smartphone applications. 
 
Ride-sharing service Uber, perhaps the most lucrative of the sharing economy cohort, has 
single-handedly transformed the world’s transport industry within the space of seven years. 
Providing customers with on-demand taxis that are supplied by fellow consumers, Uber has 
disrupted the transport industry with its lower-price points, technology-based methods of taxi 
hailing and security through individual rating scores. Framed around flexible accumulation 
theory, Uber’s business model has informalised labour in the transport industry using 
independently contracted drivers who ‘partner’ with Uber while driving their own vehicles. 
This labour informalisation has allowed Uber to bypass existing transport regulations in the 
more than 530 cities it has penetrated worldwide since its launch in 2009. According to the 
company’s co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick, the logic for this regulatory by-passing is 
simple; Uber is merely a smartphone application that helps people share, not a taxi service 
(Hamari, 2014). While Kalanick’s explanation may hold some validity, this study argues that 
the company’s labour conditions have a direct impact on its labour force, particularly in the 
developing world. Furthermore, the study will illustrate that Uber places it’s labour force in a 
position of precarity with its practices of labour classifying, dynamic pricing and rating 
structures as a system of management and evaluation. It is argued that these consequences are 
particularly unique to the Global South, with data reflecting that there are lower rates of 
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vehicle ownership in the region. The side effect of this trend is the emergence of fleet-
owners, which are Uber driver-partners that lease several of their own vehicles to drivers, 
which consequently places drivers in a position of precarity.   
 
The city of Johannesburg is the main research site that this study has employed to make the 
argument, mobilising the qualitative research methods of unstructured interviews, document 
review and autoethnography. Furthermore, the study chiefly consults the theory of precarity 
in its analysis, supplemented with theorisations on emotional labour, panopticism and flexible 
accumulation.  
 
1.2. Importance of study 
 
As stated, the significance of this study lays in the location from which it is conducted. Uber 
in the global south and South Africa has been largely left out in much of the literature around 
the subject. Studies around Uber and its legal, social and economic consequences have been 
carried out by the European Parliament (2015), Chen & Sheldon (2015), Mehman (2015), 
Hamari (2016) among many others. This work concentrated primarily and almost exclusively 
on the developed regions of Europe and the United States. As a result, the differing 
socioeconomic climate of the developing world would be a significant space in which to 
conduct a study on the penetration of the sharing economy. Unique features of 
Johannesburg’s Uber network such as the rise of fleet-ownership and driver subletting are but 
a few of the unique outcomes that the sharing economy has brought to the developing world. 
It is these outcomes that the sharing economy brings that will be explored and analysed in the 
paper for the purposes of broadening one’s knowledge into the sharing economy. Considering 
this importance, this study answers a primary research question, coupled three additional sub-
questions for increased scope.  
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1.3.  Research Questions 
 
The research question answered throughout the study makes links between the sharing 
economy, Uber and the main theoretical concepts consulted. The question is as follows; 
 
Primary Research Question 
• In what ways, if any, do the labour conditions created by ride-sharing service Uber 
affect Drivers operating in the taxicab industry of Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
Sub-questions 
• In what ways, if any, does the ‘dynamic pricing’ model implemented by Uber affect 
the density of work hours and income levels experienced drivers? 
 
• How does the ‘independent contractor’ status of Uber’s driver-partners affect the 
three-way relations between Uber, drivers and customers? 
 
• What effect, if any, does Uber’s evaluative customer to driver ‘rating’ system have on 
driver workplace behaviour? 
 
To sufficiently understand how Uber’s labour conditions place its drivers in a position of 
precarity, it would be useful to outline the study’s working definitions. This will be followed 
by a deeper description and justification of the research methods that were employed 
throughout the study. Finally, the theoretical resources consulted in the study will be outlined 
and detailed with a key focus on their significance to the primary argument. 
 
1.4.  Definitional Considerations 
 
The term labour conditions that is used throughout this study, is defined as the collective 
agreements between organizations or workmen and their employers that generally determine 
wages, hours and working conditions such as tools used in the rendering of labour (Douglas, 
1919). In accordance with this definition, the specific taxicab labour conditions that were of 
relevance to this study are as follows;  
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A. The wage structure that is used to remunerate taxicab drivers who are driver-
partners with Uber.  
B. Uber’s relationship with local taxicab regulation and the effects on workplace 
safety and practices experienced by drivers.  
C. Driver employment status and the subsequent benefits or lack thereof due to 
Uber’s business model 
D. Work hours as a direct result of practices administered in accordance to Uber’s 
business model.  
 
Uber’s labour conditions are of primary focus for the study’s research question and 
subquestions, which are pursued throughout the study with the use of a specific set of 
research methods. At a broad level, the study took the form of a qualitative research 
methodology, with the use of specific qualitative research methods. It would be useful to first 
provide a brief justification for the use of the qualitative mode of research in the study before 
moving on to detailing the research methods that were used. 
 
1.5. Research Methods 
 
Qualitative research relies largely on subjectivism rather than positivism. This means that 
qualitative researchers hold a human being’s subjectivity in creating meanings in the world 
and in the process of explaining the causal links between research and theory. All facts and 
truths in the world subsequently, are relative and not definitive as positivists would assert. 
(Bernard, 2011). As such, the qualitative mode of research was utilised because one could 
ascertain the individual driver experiences of drivers while providing working with Uber as a 
service.  
  
It is contended that it would have been challenging to understand the effect that Uber’s labour 
conditions have on drivers without an analysis of the lived experiences of drivers or suppliers 
of transport in Johannesburg, specifically Uber drivers. This is due to the labour conditions 
that Uber driver-partners may work under having a subjective thread that is relative from 
individual to individual, not sharing similar vehicle ownership-status, relative income levels 
and work hour flexibility. It thus proved more fruitful to employ more of a deductive view of 
knowledge creation around drivers and their various tribulations as participants of 
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Johannesburg’s bourgeoning sharing economy. This stated knowledge creation, was 
ascertained through a specific set of research methods as stated.  
 
1.5.1. Interview Process 
 
The prominent research method used in the study took the form of unstructured interviews 
administered to Uber driver-partners operating in Johannesburg, South Africa over the course 
of a two-and-a-half-month period. A total of eight driver-partners were solicited primarily by 
hailing the service through its smart-phone based application, and were subsequently asked if 
they would be willing to be interviewed for the purposes of the proposed master’s 
dissertation. On all occasions, verbal consent was received and this was documented in the 
form of taped-recordings. Pseudonyms were given to all participants to ensure confidentiality 
and security for both participants and researcher alike. An interview was conducted at a 
public place through a referral from an Uber driver-partner, which was the only interview that 
was conducted on a non-driving Uber-partner whom employed drivers to render their labour 
with his fleet of vehicles. Interviews were conducted in Uber trips in various locales in 
Central Johannesburg such as Melville, Braamfontein, Greenside and Houghton Estate. 
Furthermore, the interviews ranged from 15 to 21 minutes in length and were on all but one 
occasion constrained to the duration of the trip itself. The primary reason for utilising 
unstructured interviews, as opposed to semi-structured interviews for instance, was to 
complement the non-intimidatory philosophy of acquiring data from participants. Punch 
(1998) eludes to this philosophy by stating that unstructured interviews are a useful way of 
understanding the complex behaviour of people without an invasion of their most private 
space, which may undermine the participants’ right to privacy and possibly the research 
process. Unstructured interviews therefore, became an extension of the continuous 
ethnographical participation within the Uber driver’s organic work environment, with 
questions generated in line with the natural flow of interaction. The unstructured nature of the 
interview process with Uber driver-partners, opened the space for respondents to develop 
their perspectives and direct the line of enquiry into areas they deem to be significant. A 
broader picture of Uber drivers’ contexts was readable through unstructured interviews. This 
generated a conducive platform for a deeper interpretation of the situational effects that 
Uber’s business model had on Uber drivers’ day-to-day actions and activities. As stated 
before, unstructured interviews formed the larger methodological framework of the study – a 
framework hallmarked by an autoethnographical model of participant observation.  
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1.5.2. Autoethnography  
 
For definitional purposes, autoethnography is an approach to research that seeks to actively 
describe and analyse personal experience to understand cultural experience. Furthermore, it 
consults elements of autobiography and ethnography. When writing an autobiography, the 
researcher or author retroactively and selectively documents past experiences. Generally, the 
author or researcher does not live through these experiences solely to make them part of a 
published document, rather, these experiences are assembled with the use of hindsight 
(Bruner, 1993). When researchers conduct ethnography, they conduct study on culture’s 
relational practices such as shared values and beliefs and common experiences in a culture 
order to better understand that culture (Goodall, 2001). An ethnographer may interview 
members of a culture, observe their behaviour and actions as well as analyse the use of space 
and time to better understand that culture. In autoethnography, a researcher retrospectively 
and selectively documents epiphanies that are based from, or made possible by, being part of 
a culture or having a cultural identity (Foster, 2006). Autoethnography is typically enacted 
through using personal experiences to illustrate facets of cultural experience, which can be 
done through comparing personal experience against existing research. This, as a result, 
involves and personalises the researcher’s participation in the research process.  
  
This research method was particularly useful for this study due to the researcher’s active and 
ongoing experience in the Uber process prior and during the research process. As an active 
user of Uber for his own personal mobility needs around Johannesburg, the researcher has 
personal experience of the culture of Uber. Autoethnography thus was useful in comparing 
the observations made on Uber’s drivers with the researchers own hindsight experience of 
Uber, helping one better understand Uber’s business culture. Four of the eight interviewed 
drivers were observed for ethnographic purposes. The observations aimed to ascertain the 
atmospherical qualities behind Uber’s service, the mannerisms of driver-partners, their 
interaction with myself as a customer and participant of the sharing economy. Furthermore, 
ethnographical observations were geared towards better understanding the effect that Uber’s 
bilateral rating system has on the performance, behaviour and actions of driver partners on 
the job. Further research, which complimented the unstructured interviews and 
autoethnography, came in the form of document review, which provided the basis for an 
orientation into the inner mechanics of Uber’s historical background as well as its principle 
business functionality.  
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1.5.3. Document Review 
 
The analysis of Uber’s primary business model, functions and practices were made through 
document review. Document review entailed ascertaining Uber’s primary policy positions 
regarding its various business practices available on various Uber document publications. 
The premise behind Uber’s policy positions were important in comparing them with those 
experienced by drivers, assisting in for gauging any correlations or contradictions. In sum, 
unstructured interviews, autoethnography and document review lubricated the process of 
knowledge generation. In conjunction with these research methods, a set of theoretical 
concepts were consulted to create a theoretical framework from which to analyse the 
knowledge that was created through the research methods. 
 
1.6. Theoretical Resources 
 
The study consulted with four primary theoretical tools that were used as a guide into the 
respective findings into Uber’s potential effect on the labour conditions of drivers in 
Johannesburg’s taxicab industry. The theoretical tools comprised of David Harvey’s 
reflections on ‘Post-modernism’, his theory on flexible accumulation, Michel Foucault’s 
concept of Panopticism, Guy Standing’s theorisation on Precarity and finally Arlie 
Hochschild’s emotional labour theory. These theoretical tools would allow for the 
construction of a broader theoretical framework that would guide one’s understanding of the 
findings.  
 
Precarity will be chiefly consulted in assessing the effects of Uber while emotional labour, 
panopticism and flexible accumulation will describe the reasoning and basis of Uber’s 
various business processes. Guy Standing’s labour market security is used as a framework in 
which to explain the various forms of precarity that Uber places onto drivers (Standing, 
2011). Foucault’s theory on panopticism (1975) and David Harvey’s flexible accumulation 
theory (1990) is mobilised in explaining the premise behind Uber’s dynamic pricing model. 
The informalisation of labour, presented by David Harvey, is used to explain Uber’s 
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employment classification of Uber drivers. Uber’s rating system is explained as being the 
primary arc of Uber’s panoptic mechanism of control and management of drivers. 
Consequently, Hochschild emotional labour theory is used in explaining the behavioural 
effects of the rating system onto drivers. As such, a broad and succinct exploration into the 
central tenets of the four theoretical tools would be useful before transitioning to the findings 
of the research.   
 
1.6.1. Precarity 
 
Precarity, or a collective term the ‘precariat’ was first uttered and used by a group of French 
sociologists in the 1980’s in attempts to describe a cohort of temporary or seasonal workers. 
The term ‘precarity’, conventionally associated with a sense of insecurity and a likelihood of 
collapse, being closely tethered into the context of labour or workers, was articulated by Guy 
Standing (2011). Through his work that aimed to analyse the birth of a new class of people 
on the periphery of employment and security, Standing, rooted the birth a ‘precariat’ class to 
the aftershocks of the spread of the ‘neo-liberal’ economic model at the start of the 1980s - a 
model that advocated for increased growth and development through increased market 
competitiveness. A by-product of which was the transferal of risks and insecurity onto 
workers and their families as the size of the state began to shrink in the global economy 
(Standing, 2011). As such, this wave of neo-liberalism inadvertently ushered in the growth of 
a new precarious class.  
 
Standing defined the precariat specifically as alluding to a distinctive socio-economic group, 
creating a tangible demarcation of what the group was along with creating what Max Weber 
would deem to be an ‘ideal type’ of precariat (Standing, 2011: 8). He contextualises the 
proletariat as a class through a comparison to existing classes, helping locate the Precariat in 
the class system. He explains that at the very summit of the class system is the elite, 
consisting of the billionaires and proverbial ‘top 1%’ that controlled economies and lorded 
over the universe. Second is what he calls the salariat, who bask in the comfort of full 
employment, paid holidays and enterprise benefits. They are followed by the Proficians, who 
are technocrats and artisanal workers who have limited upward mobility but relative security. 
The conventional working class follows a group that Standing describes as a ‘shrinking core’ 
or blue collar workers who are the building blocks of welfare states. Underneath these four 
groups, standing places the Precariat – who are flanked by an army of unemployed and 
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‘detached groups of socially ill misfits living off the dregs of society’ (Standing, 2011: 11).  
The core of the Precariat comprises of the unique state of holding no bargaining of trust or 
security in exchange for subordination, along with a distinct lack of secure work-based 
identity. To delve into more Standing’s conception of precarity, he creates a framework or 
somewhat of a criteria as to what the Precariat is or rather what it is not. In this framework 
Standing explains that the Precariat consists of people who lack the seven forms of ‘labour-
related security’, namely; 
 
‘Labour market security – Adequate income-earning opportunities; at the macro-
level, this is epitomised by a government commitment to ‘full employment’.  
Employment security – Protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulations on hiring 
and ring, imposition of costs on employers for failing to adhere to rules and so on.  
Job security – Ability and opportunity to retain a niche in employment, plus barriers 
to skill dilution, and opportunities for ‘upward’ mobility in terms of status and 
income.                    
Work security – Protection against accidents and illness at work, through, for 
example, safety and health regulations, limits on working time, unsociable hours, 
night work for women, as well as compensation for mishaps.  
Skill reproduction security – Opportunity to gain skills, through apprenticeships, 
employment training and so on, as well as opportunity to make use of competencies.  
Income security – Assurance of an adequate stable income, protected through, for 
example, minimum wage machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, 
progressive taxation to reduce inequality and to supplement low incomes.  
Representation security – Possessing a collective voice in the labour market, through, 
for example, independent trade unions, with a right to strike.’ (Standing, 2011: 10) 
 
The labour-related security model is useful in assessing the ramifications of Uber driver-
partners’ independent contractor status with the service, coupled with having a greater 
analysis of the socioeconomic positioning that Uber’s business model and practices place the 
labour that ‘partners’ with the service. The labour market security model presented by 
Standing in his articulation of precarity draws links to insecurities of various kinds. These 
insecurities are argued as stemming primarily from and increased by Uber’s business model. 
Three theoretical resources are consulted in highlighting the premise behind facets of Uber’s 
business model, the first of which is flexible accumulation. 
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1.6.2. Flexible Accumulation 
 
The theory of flexible accumulation, or also referred to as Post Fordism, was created by 
distinguished geography professor David Harvey (1990) in his meditation over the validity of 
‘post modernity’ as a mode of human experience, shifting away from modernity. Harvey 
explained flexible accumulation as being the result of what he deemed to be a ‘surface shift’ 
of the nature of capitalism in the world, especially after the oil shocks of 1973 and the 
increased competition in foreign markets due to the growing spread of globalisation. This 
surface shift in the modern capitalist production from the Fordist mode, described as an 
economic and social system based on the industrialised, standardised mass production and 
consumption, to flexible accumulation, highlighted by small-batch production, economies of 
scope, new information technologies and the increased informalisation of work (Harvey, 
1990).  
 
Flexible accumulation prompted an environment of mass unemployment and widespread 
political repression, such as curbs put on unionisation, forced firms to move from mass 
production to a new tactic of flexible specialisation. Instead of having production focused 
around generic products, firms now shifted their efforts to producing a diverse array of 
product lines that targeted different segments of consumer groups, crafting products to 
different tastes and preferences. An important cog in the emergence and growth of flexible 
accumulation theory is the development of the computer and other forms of information 
technology which, as Harvey explains, acted as alternative production and labour control 
systems opening the way to high remuneration of technical, managerial and entrepreneurial 
skills (Harvey, 1990). Computers and other forms of information technologies contributed to 
the ability to change the characteristics of the goods produced as well as, most importantly, 
analyse data to order suppliers and produce goods that were congruent with current demand 
flows.   
 
Labour and skill sets were also important in the growth of flexible accumulation, with the 
workforce now compartmentalised into groups of skill-flexible and temporary, sub-
contracting segments. A flexible labour pool stimulated and lubricated production processes 
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to be geared towards specialisation of goods (Jessop, 1995). The realms of the economy and 
political landscapes were also nuanced by the growth of what Harvey deemed to be flexible 
accumulation. In economics, flexible accumulation brought with it a decline in regulation 
with mass unionisation growing obsolete and being replaced by workplace-based bargaining 
processes. As a result, the work force experienced a rise in subcontracted work along with 
self-employed and home-based work. In the political realm, class-based political parties 
waned with the proliferation of intersectional social movements based on region, gender and 
race (Jessop, 1995).  
 
Flexible accumulation in sum brings to the fore a few critical variables relevant to the 
argument made in the study. Firstly, eventualities of the flexible accumulation model such as 
a decrease in unionisation and informalisation of work are critical in understanding how the 
labour that services Uber are independently contracted and have decreased levels of wage and 
workplace bargaining power due to a lack of unionisation. Secondly, the theory also 
compliments precarity with increasing ones understanding on how levels of workplace and 
income security affect the positioning of labour in the sharing economy. Thirdly, the 
segmentation of labour into different flexible pools, coupled with the shift from mass 
manufacturing to services after the 1970s is pertinent in understanding the conceptual context 
that underpins the business model of Uber. Finally, flexible accumulation aids in assessing 
the role of information technology and computers such as Uber’s smartphone application in 
presenting new forms of analysing various levels of demand flows from consumers. The new 
forms of analysis that information technology and computers create also assist in efficiently 
managing and surveying labour processes, an outcome that is expanded more in the theory of 
panopticism 
 
1.6.3. Panopticism  
 
The theory of Panopticism, first conceptualised by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, and 
vastly developed by French philosopher Michel Foucault is to be mobilised in contextualising 
and unearthing the findings of the research into Uber’s potential effect on the labour 
conditions of the taxicab industry of Johannesburg. Panopticism could perhaps be distilled 
into two interlinked realms, a physical space and a social construct, with the latter finding 
initial grounding in the former. The idea of the panopticon was developed by Jeremy 
Bentham to describe a physical structure of complete control and surveillance over prison 
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inmates or occupants by a central force, nominally described as a guard. The physical 
structure’s design would be in the form of a circular building that had an observation tower at 
the centre, with an open space between the tower and the surrounding circular wall. The 
tower would be comprised of large glass frames that provided visibility to the entirety of the 
circular wall, which would contain cells or rooms of occupants or inmates. The individual 
cells or rooms of the circular wall would be flooded with extreme light which would perform 
a dual function of making the occupants visible to their watcher and the watcher invisible to 
the blinding effects of the flood lights. These flood lights would also make the act of 
surveillance more passive to due to subjects not knowing whether they are being surveyed or 
not. The occupants or inmates thus would be, as Foucault explains, ‘the object of 
information, never a subject of communication’ (Foucault, 1975: 200). The panopticon thus, 
could be considered a means or a philosophy of control through a specific implicit 
mechanisation of surveillance that used the least resources possible (as seen with one tower, 
housed by one guard, presiding over a mass of occupants or inmates).  
 
Panopticism theory could be a mechanism of power that bears similarity with the socio-
economic system of capitalism, as illustrated through three tenets. The first would be to 
obtain a tactic of power that would deplete the least amount of resources possible (as seen in 
economics with an emphasis of efficiency in the production process). Secondly, a tactic of 
power that would aim to achieve maximum intensity over as wide of a space as possible (as 
seen in Economic theory such as Fordism, emphasising mass production for a mass consumer 
base). Thirdly, the dividends of tactic (control and surveillance) can be inextricably linked to 
the apparatuses used (education, industry, socialisation). The theory has also been used in the 
information technology realm, which is pertinent for the research terrain of this paper. 
Shoshana Zuboff’s (1988) links Panopticism as a means of surveillance and control to the 
work environment. Zuboff makes the distinction from Panopticons in the traditional sense, as 
per Bentham and Foucault, and Information Panopticons. Information Panopticons would not 
make use of physical arrangements such as constructing structures or the intervention of 
human agency. Rather, computer technology surveys the activities of workers through the 
daily tasks assigned to them. Surveillance would span from the individual duration that every 
worker takes to complete a task to the hours of operation, would be recorded by computer 
technology. Based on the data gathered by computer technology, a worker’s performance 
could be measured accordingly (Zuboff, 1988). Information power thus could be a centralised 
entity that used apparatuses such as computer technology to observe and control subjects. 
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This theory is useful in assessing Uber’s operational mechanisms of control and surveillance 
in creating a work environment and unique labour conditions. Furthermore, these unique 
labour conditions that arise due to the surveillance and management mechanisms associated 
with panopticism, could profoundly affect labour workplace behaviour, administering 
processes such as emotional labour.  
 
1.6.4. Emotional Labour 
 
Emotional labour is a theory of workplace practices first defined by sociologist Arlie 
Hochschild (1983). In the work, Hochschild explains how emotional expressions and 
engagements form part of the job description, often manifesting in engineered senses of self 
and reflexive performances. In the opening sequences of the work, the author, compares the 
experience of a flight attendant to those of a minor factory worker portrayed in Karl Marx’s 
Das Kapital. Hochschild exclaims how the flight attendant’s expressions and gestures are 
similar as to that of the minor’s body, both being apparatuses of labour. As such, Hochschild 
elaborates by explaining that the manner of the service rendered becomes the nature of the 
service itself (Hochschild, 1983). Furthermore, emotional labour is explained as a by-product 
of ‘impression management’, with the author arguing that emotional cues may be among the 
most important in human interaction. Taking that into consideration, Hochschild defines 
emotional labour as; 
The management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display; 
emotional labour is sold for a wage and there has exchange value. [Hochschild] uses 
the synonymous terms emotion work or emotion management to refer to these same 
acts done in a private context where they have use value (Hochschild, 1983: 7). 
This process involves several internal mechanisation, often referred to as the requirement to 
“coordinate self and feeling”, and to conceal that process because if this processes shows 
overtly, the ‘product-passenger contentment is damaged (passenger in the context of the 
flight attendant example). Hochschild, as a result, explains that this coordination of self and 
feeling is conditioned by training one’s feelings, and not just training one’s overt 
performance of feelings (Hochschild, 1983: 19). The historical origins behind the existence 
of the emotional labour would be the transition from manufacturing intensive industries to 
service industries that required a heightened sense of interpersonal skills. The process of 
feeling management, which very much on the onus of the employer of the product, is 
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instrumental in setting the conditions for emotional labour, with Hochschild explaining how 
businesses often attach advertising to employee behaviour, highlighting the example of 
America airline carrier Delta airlines’ advertising campaigns of the 1970s which created the 
narrative for certain flight attendant behaviour moving forward (Hochschild, 1983). The 
research methods and theoretical resources were utilised onto a service in the form of Uber, 
which is resides at an interface between technology and the taxicab industry. Considering 
this, it would be beneficial to locate Uber within this interface before discussing its tendency 
to induce labour precarity. 
 
1.7.  Conclusion 
 
The structure of the study will take the form of three chapters. This chapter has highlighted 
the research methodology that the study utilised for knowledge creation. This included a 
detailed overview of the theoretical resources used and a brief introduction into the profile of 
drivers that were interviewed for the study. The second chapter provides a background into 
two facets of Uber’s emergence; the taxicab industry and the sharing economy. In the first 
instance, the historical basis of the taxicab industry will be analysed, with the rise of 
regulation given significant attention. Secondly, literature related to the sharing economy will 
be explored, placing an emphasis on the rise of the new technology and the Internet as a 
precursor for the emergence of Uber. Finally, flexible accumulation will be argued to be the 
linkage between the taxicab industry and the sharing economy, ultimately giving birth to a 
service such as Uber. The third chapter, will explain how Uber’s business model creates 
precarious labour conditions for labour. In this chapter, facets of the sharing economy that 
Uber instils in its business model such as the informalisation of labour, technological 
surveillance and management and fluctuating income will be showcased as but a few ways in 
which labour is placed in a position of precarity. Before following the order of the study, a 
brief overview of the significance of the study would be useful in contextualising the chapters 
to follow.  
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Chapter 2 - The Preconditions to Uber: Taxis and Technology 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Uber, as a company that provides a platform for the sharing of transportation within the 
taxicab industry, smartly combines both elements of the taxicab industry and technology. The 
following chapter explores both these as seminal cogs in the nexus that makes Uber the 
service it is today. As such, the chapter comprises of two distinct sections. First, literature 
relating to the historical basis of the taxi industry unearths the evolution of the taxi industry’s 
functions and regulatory practices both in the developed and the developing world. It is 
argued that regulation, a legislative arm in the global taxicab industry, serves the dual 
function of labour protection and management, this argument is exhausted using the work of 
Snead (2015) and Russell & Hodges (2009). This argument problematises Uber’s evasion of 
various taxicab industry regulations across the world and in South Africa. In assisting how 
Uber evades these regulatory requirements, the sharing economy is analysed, particularly 
exploring the work of Hamari (2014) and DiNucci (1999). This exploration unearths the 
proliferation of the Internet and Web 2.0 as platforms that created the bridge in which 
technology could later infiltrate the taxicab industry through Uber and as a result by-pass 
regulation. This chapter serves as a but a mere exploratory prologue for following Chapter, 
which substantively analyses Uber’s business model and why it creates precarious labour 
conditions for Uber drivers, particularly in Johannesburg.  
 
Part I: The Taxicab Industry 
Today, the taxicab industry around the world consists of a myriad of different kinds functions 
and carries with it a diverse array of forms. In the developing world taxicabs often run 
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concurrently with lower-income based modes of transport such as share-taxis, often found in 
various regions of the developing world such the Fula Fula’s of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or the minibus taxis of South Africa. In the developed world, taxicabs too run 
concurrent to other forms transportation such as the subway in New York or the Tube in 
London (Grava, 2003). The positioning of the taxicab industry in the core and the periphery 
of the world’s economies is diversified with different consumer choices. Wong (2008), 
explains how in the developed world, taxicabs are often used with other forms of 
transportation due its perceived efficiency compared to the use of one’s own vehicle. In the 
developing world, the taxicab industry often resides on the periphery of larger scale lower-
income mass taxi services that are involuntarily used by large segments of society based on 
affordability.  Wong explains that the taxicab industry is often categorised as having multiple 
user classes in every city, with an entrenched sense of customer hierarchical choice (ibid). 
Uber, having penetrated more than 500 cities both in the developed and developing world, 
has entered taxicab landscapes that are heterogeneous in nature. As such, it would be useful 
to review some of the literature concerning the advent of the modern taxicab industry both 
internationally and in South Africa as the primary research site of this study. This will be 
useful in ascertaining the challenges that Uber faces and indeed may create when applying its 
business model universally in different taxicab landscapes.  
 
2.2. Historical Basis and Background 
 
The first modern taxi emerged in the United Kingdom, continental Europe and the United 
States in the beginning of the twentieth century. The innovation of electric-powered taxi cabs 
replacing the heavier horse-drawn handsome cabs that dominated prior decades was a key 
development that would shape the trajectory of the industry moving forward. In New York, 
the first modern taxicab named the electrobat, was designed and built in 1894 by 
Philadelphia-based engineer Henry G. Morris and chemist Pedro G. Salom, becoming later 
adopted by one of the first prominent taxicab companies in New York, the Electric Vehicle 
Company (EVC) in 1899 (Gilby, 1903). In the United Kingdom, the taxi industry comprised 
primarily of handsome cabs that predominantly operated around central London in the 
1890’s, before the proliferation of gasoline-powered electric cabs in 1905. The development 
of taxicabs both in New York and London coincided with the creation of the first modern 
fare-meter by German Friedrich Wilhelm Gustav in the mid-1890’s. This innovation, was an 
initial example of a disruptive technology, a theory pioneered by Clayton Christensen (1997). 
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Disruptive technology, defined as a technology that disrupts existing industry practices and 
surges up a market, acted as a revolutionary technology in the early inception of the taxicab 
industry in Europe and the United States. The innovation was popularised in Europe in 1906 
and North America in 1907 (McArdle, 2012).  
 
Following a fire that destroyed a third of its vehicle inventory, the EVC in New York was 
liquidated in 1907. Horse-drawn carriages were once again used as a primary form of taxicab 
for hire services in city. At the start of 1908, Harry N. Allen created the New York Taxicab 
Company, acquiring a fleet of gasoline-powered vehicles. Within ten years of the Taxicab 
Company, a multitude of similar taxi-cab companies proliferated around New York City, 
with a standardised fare system hovering around 50 cents per mile (Russell & Hodges, 2009). 
The significance of the New York Taxicab Company was that it quickly became the largest 
taxicab service of its time, pioneering a linear fare-based system of taxicab operation. The 
early advent of traditional taxicab services in the United States and the United Kingdom 
created the skeletal model for the industry that would proliferate the world over.  
 
The growth of the taxicab industry primarily through the 1920’s saw a heightened pool of 
drivers servicing cities in North America and Continental Europe, with regulation touted by 
local government to maintain healthy competition and price stability in the industry. The first 
implementation of regulatory mechanisms in the taxi industry are significant in relation to 
establishing the most prominent regulatory practices along with creating an industry standard 
model for fare setting. 
 
2.3. Regulating the Industry 
 
Much like the creation of the rise of the taxicab industry itself, the initial and most extensive 
regulatory mechanisms in the taxi industry originated in New York and the United Kingdom. 
The Medallion system in New York, and the knowledge in London remain industry standard 
to today. The function and relationship that taxicab regulation has on fare setting would be 
significant in a later analysis on Uber’s stance on regulation and the effect it has on its labour 
force as a result.  
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New York City’s initial regulation of the taxicab industry came as a direct result of the city’s 
socio-economic climate of the time. The Great Depression of the 1930’s all but debilitated 
the city’s bourgeoning industry. The Great Depression created concern around the taxicab 
industry in the city with the industry having more drivers than passengers and drivers willing 
to render their labour for increasing hours. The result of which placed drivers in a precarious 
position, with a lack of income security plaguing drivers due to a decrease in the supply of 
consumers. The precarity plaguing drivers, compelled local government to create a monopoly 
company to maintain the mechanical quality and maintenance of the vehicles and preserve 
the wages and work hours for drivers (Russell & Hodges, 2009). Under this system, the local 
city government would issue stringent permits in the form of medallions that would regulate 
the number of taxicabs floating in the city. The basic premise behind a medallion system, is 
the medallion itself, which is usually a metal plaque attached physically to the vehicle. The 
medallion does not act as a license to drive the taxi, but rather to operate one. Without the 
medallion, it is illegal to operate a taxi in New York and other cities in the United States that 
use medallion systems (Snead, 2015). The medallion acts as a permit to label oneself a 
taxicab operator in a designated city, state or province. The medallion systems, along with 
other forms of taxicab regulatory frameworks have been argued to be a form of economic 
protectionism, suppressing competition in the industry along with protecting certain 
governmental interests that benefit from maintaining an economic monopoly over the taxicab 
industry. However, as will be argued, regulation acts as a form of income security for drivers, 
a form of security that Uber will be argued to disregard.  
 
2.3.1.  Regulation as Income Security 
 
Under the medallion system, drivers that drive the taxicabs begin their shift with a wage 
deficit which would effectively start them owing money to the respective medallion owner. 
The reason for this is that there is a price floor of $100 for every day of operation, which 
covers the cost of the actual medallion rental. Medallions and their availability depend on the 
respective American city, with 13,400 medallions available in New York, with a group of 
licensed drivers vying for these medallions which results in an increase in the price of 
medallions in the city. In Boston, 6,200 licensed drivers compete to lease 1825 medallions – 
the provisions of medallions by city governments prevents rival taxicab services from being 
established (Snead, 2015). The medallion system, increased the average wage of drivers due 
to a regulation on the supply of drivers. The premise of regulation of drivers forms a critical 
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part in the discussion as to how Uber drivers today are in a position of precarity. The 
regulatory system in the city of London, places a greater spotlight on how regulation can also 
become a system of advanced management and surveillance.  
 
2.3.2. Regulation as Management 
 
In the city of London, a route-finding test named ‘The Knowledge’ is used as a mechanism 
from which to issue driving permits and regulate the supply of taxi-cabs in London and other 
parts of the United Kingdom. A typical London taxicab driver is required to have extensive 
knowledge into the geography and routing maps of the London metropole, as such, an in-
depth study of several pre-set London street routes and other miscellaneous places of 
potential interest has been created titled ‘The Knowledge’. Potential taxicab drivers in 
London must complete and pass to be granted permission to become a London taxi cab 
driver. Potential London taxicab drivers must learn 320 standard routes through central 
London, along with a substantial grasping of points of interest around the city, such as 
prominent squares, clubs, hospitals, hotels and theatres (Gloss, McGregor & Brown, 2016). 
The knowledge, thus becomes a mechanism for evaluating drivers according to stringent 
guidelines, with the test acting as a panoptic structure from the prospective drivers are often 
culled for failing to adhere to internalising the internal structure of the city of London. The 
perceived difficulty of the test has resulted in a declining number, and aging, taxicab 
workforce in the London dating back to the 1960s.  
 
The creation of the taxicab industries of The United States and the United Kingdom, provided 
a narrative for the taxi industry of the future, specifically the functionality of the taxi 
industry, its basic fare-system models and the existence of regulatory systems. However, 
these pioneer industries also illustrated how mechanisms such as regulation can have 
paradoxical effects on labour itself. While the Medallion system helped secure the income of 
drivers and curb industry precarity, the Knowledge’s stringent demarcations for evaluating 
drivers inevitably decreased driver inclusion into the industry. The taxicab industry finds 
much of its historical grounding in the western world, with its model often transplanted onto 
other socioeconomic regions of the world. As stated before, the taxicab industry has unique 
structural characteristics in the developing and developed world respectively. Uber’s 
penetration into both markets, illustrates the paradoxical effects it may have on both markets. 
It is useful to providing a review of the taxicab industry of South Africa, which will be with 
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the purpose contrasting its characteristics with those of the developing world. The taxicab 
industry in South Africa as a secondary mode of transport to the minibus taxi industry, the 
racialisation of transport along with the attempts to reform taxicabs in South Africa will be 
discussed as a precursor for the penetration of Uber in the country. 
2.4. Race, Regulation and Reform: Transport in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s transport system is a product of an economy systematically constructed on the 
back of racial ideology. The South African taxi industry has been celebrated as ‘one of the 
most extraordinary socio-economic phenomena in South Africa’, with free market capital 
advocates viewing the growth of the industry as a ‘silent revolution transforming South 
Africa into one of the most integrated economies’ and often referred to as one of the ‘success 
stories’ of black small business (Khoza, 1992: 232). However, the acclaim is only directed at 
a segment, albeit a large one, of the South African transport industry, that being the minibus 
taxi industry. In South Africa, the most common and widely used type of taxi is the minibus 
taxi, which can be grouped into the ‘share taxi’ bracket of the taxi industry alluded to earlier 
in this chapter. These minibus taxis operate by picking up clients on predetermined routes, or 
from fixed taxi ranks. The minibus taxi industry boasts a large section of the South African 
taxi landscape and accounts for 65% of current public transport (Mpho, 2012). The taxicab 
industry on the other hand, only occupies around 10% of the greater taxi market in the 
country, it is a relatively ancillary cog in the formation of the taxi industry in South Africa. 
To justify the taxicab’s relatively small size in South Africa, a brief historical analysis would 
be useful in contextualising the dynamics of transport in the country.  
 
The growth of the black taxi industry in South Africa can be located at the turn of the 
twentieth century, where before the rise of modern black taxis there were horse-drawn cabs, 
much similar much those discussed earlier in respect to the United States and the United 
Kingdom, before trains were favoured as the mode of transport for most black workers from 
the 1920’s (Khosa, 1992). The principal difference between the taxi industries of western 
metropoles such as London and New York and pre-democratic South Africa is that of 
regulation. The nature of regulation, which was enforced largely around racialised legislation 
within South Africa, was to stifle the growth and improvement of black industry, and to 
informalise attempts to monetise from the black mobility space. This regulation and forced 
informalisation first occurred within the 1940’s and 1950’s, when black business as a general 
industry was stifled by several repressive legislative mechanisms aiming to repress and 
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discourage black entrepreneurship in urbanised areas. The 1970s saw the enactment of the 
‘One-man-One-Business’ policy, which saw black taxis having passenger restrictions and the 
confiscation of their vehicles for menial offenses (Beavon & Rogerson, 1990). Taxi licensing 
was controlled and regulated by the white apartheid apparatus and as a result there was a 
profound scepticism around the potential success and growth of the bourgeoning black taxi 
industry. In 1978, a turning point in the black taxi industry saw the advent of the kombi, 
which allowed taxis to carry up to eight passengers instead of the previous minimum four. As 
a result, the industry experienced a dramatic take off at the start of the 1980’s, with permits 
granted in Johannesburg rising from 401 in 1985 to 15,160 in 1990. The increase in the 
number of taxi licenses issued nationwide, both for Kombis and sedans, rose by 2,639 per 
cent over a period of six years by the end of the 1990 (Khosa, 1992).  
 
The minibus taxi industry serviced a large section of South Africa’s poor to lower-income 
population, using a mode of service akin to a Fordist mass-production. In later years, the 
industry and later Uber, would rely largely on flexible accumulation characterised by service 
specialisation and small-scale, personalised production to flourish. This shift in production 
forms the basis for a discussion on the taxicab industry in South Africa, its regulation and the 
introduction of Uber. As stated previously, while being by in large secondary in the greater 
transport landscape of the country, the taxicab industry created the initial conditions for 
Uber’s penetration. Through the late 1990’s and 2000’s, metered taxis became the primary 
form of taxicab travel in major South African cities, specifically Johannesburg. The birth of 
metered-taxis set the ground for governmental regulation, fare-setting and industry practices, 
conditions that Uber would have to manage upon their launch in the country in 2012.  
 
2.5. Metered Taxicabs in South Africa 
 
It can be discerned that the primary apparatus of the formation of the South African taxi 
industry has been the minibus taxi, primarily operated through an economy primarily 
populated by black entrepreneurship. Research reflects that the taxi industry as of 2016 
accounts for approximately 70% of South Africa’s transport usage, with 10% of that number 
being metered taxis or taxicabs. Furthermore, there is an estimated 20,000 metred taxis on the 
road in South Africa as of 2016 (Who Owns Whom, 2016). Gauteng boasts around 3700 
metred taxis, with only 1860 deemed to be legal. The legality of a metered taxi operation can 
be demarcated by holding a permit of operation along with abiding by the definitional criteria 
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of being a metered taxi operator in the country. According to the National Land 
Transportation Transition Act of 2000, a taxicab service in South Africa is defined as: 
 
‘a means of public transport operated by means of a motor vehicle which is designed, 
or lawfully adopted… to carry fewer than 9 seated persons, including the driver, 
where that vehicle – (a) is available for hire by hailing, by telephone or otherwise; (b) 
may stand for hire at a rank: and (c) is equipped with a sealed meter, in good working 
order, for the purpose of determining the fare payable.” (National Land 
Transportation Act, 2000: 8).  
 
Metered reading fares are charged, on average, at an initial fare of R2.00, then R5.50 per 
kilometre and 10 cents per 20 second period of engine idling time. Furthermore, no charge is 
incurred for the distance travelled by the taxi to the client, with some metered taxi companies 
offering special rates of up to 50% discount for disabled passengers and pensioners (Moyake, 
2006).  In theory, metered taxi companies are housed through a central control centre from 
which they can be hailed telephonically, however there is also a large segment of 
unregistered metered taxi drivers whom by-pass the control centre model of acquiring 
business. Unregistered ‘metered’ taxis operate in a nuanced capacity, where they initially 
acquire clients through parking at taxi ranks and cruising past points of interests and pick-up 
spots, usually distributing business cards to retain clients. Unregistered metered taxis usually 
aren’t liable for paying month membership fees of R500 (Moyake, 2006).  
 
While most metered taxis, as stipulated by the National Land Transportation Act, can be 
hailed through telephone or ‘otherwise’ while stationed at taxi ranks, there is also provision 
for roaming or ‘floating’ taxis. However, various provincial governments have prohibited this 
from of acquiring clients only, allowing direct telephone bookings or taxi pick-ups at 
specified taxi ranks (Lowitt, 2006). In South Africa’s major cities of Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Durban, most metered taxi operators have successfully negotiated permission to 
station their vehicles at major hotels, airports and major retail precincts. While national 
legislation makes provision for cruising metered taxis, provincial government’s reluctance to 
allow cruising metered taxis has seen a severe shortage of floating taxis and the systematic 
eradication of this form of acquiring business from the culture of metered transport in South 
Africa. The penetration of Uber, has seen the service occupy the loopholes that South 
Africa’s National Land Transportation Act creates.  
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In a precursor before South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup football 
tournament, the Department of Transport drafted The Public Transport Strategy and Action 
Plan [1] (PTSAP), which problematised the metered taxi model currently in operation in 
South Africa at the time, summarising the metered taxi problem as ‘the relative absence of 
metered taxis, particularly ‘cruising taxis’, in South African cities represents a major gap in 
the public transport system, particularly in view of the coming FIFA World Cup’ (Pillary & 
Seedat, 2007). In response to this problem, the PTSAP prioritised the creation of a metered 
taxi operation in the country that would offer consistently high standards of service in terms 
of availability, comfort, safety and security with fares that stimulate the widespread usage by 
the population (PTSAP, 2007). The department proposed three levels of metered taxi, 
namely: luxury or executive, standard and economy, these being tiered options for the 
different economic strata of the population. This tiered model that would later be employed 
Uber with its similar model (UberX, UberBLACK & UberVAN). Following the proposal, no 
concerted efforts came to fruition both on the level of creating an inclusive metered taxi 
industry and introducing cruising taxis in cities or providing tiered-level metered taxis. 
However, it is interesting to note that national government acknowledged the opportunities 
behind creating such an industry, which created the groundwork for Uber’s subsequent 
introduction.   
 
Lowitt (2006) provides an analysis of potential opportunities of having a widespread usage of 
the metered taxi industry in South Africa by focusing efforts on the micro level demand 
conditions already present in South Africa. Lowitt elaborates that while there is a culture of 
public transport usage in most of the developed world, the culture does not exist in South 
Africa in middle and upper income residents in urban areas (ibid). Lowitt traces this culture 
to historical processes, namely high private vehicle ownership, low levels of congestion, high 
parking availability and low parking costs in South Africa. This was important in explaining 
how while these historical processes begin to change, the impetus for a viable metered taxi 
industry in South Africa begins to grow. Lowitt explains how the middle class has grown 
substantially since the advent of democracy, citing a yearly increase in vehicle financing 
percentage, especially among black families, which in turn creates increased congestion 
(Lowitt, 2006). In response, Lowitt proposed a cruising taxi market with stringent regulation, 
allowing for there to be asymmetry of price information for passengers to know where the 
reasonable price level is, but also for drivers to not over-charge or under-charge which would 
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sap the market or reduce their wages respectively (Lowitt, 2006). The space for a service 
such as Uber was created, with the company offering cruising taxicabs with a transparent 
fare-price model. Championing itself as a sharing service as opposed to a taxi service, Uber 
vehicles have been floating around several major South African cities since it initially 
launched in the country in 2012. Furthermore, the service has negated the process of carrying 
the same registration permits that metered taxis are obligated to attain. Metered Taxis in the 
country have reacted negatively to the service’s penetration, with public displays of defiance 
and violence in major South African cities 
 
2.6. Uber’s Penetration of the South African Market 
 
The sharing economy is a phenomenon that rose to prominence primarily in the western 
centres of Europe and the United States. Sharing Economy services such as Airbnb and Uber 
have only recently penetrated the global south with forays into Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, Brazil, 
Argentina and South Africa coming after 2012. Uber in particular, launched its first African 
office in Johannesburg in 2014, ready to enter the scene of a complex economy highlighted 
by high levels of inequality, racial division and poor job security. Uber’s growth in the 
country between 2014 and 2015 has as stated before been met with a high level of resistance 
from industry competitor. Phillip, a long-standing Uber driver in Johannesburg, reflected on 
his start with the company, explaining; 
 
‘I’m one of the first guys on Uber, I started two years ago – the industry was quite 
small. The metered guys did not really know about us. I could drive anywhere and 
pick up clients. But when we started to grow, you could see that they started to notice. 
They slowly got angry’ 
  
Uber continued to grow exponentially in the country and in May 2016, eight regional South 
African taxi companies and 150 members of the Metered Taxi Association of South African 
filed and application against Uber to the Competition Commission for what they deemed the 
company to be ‘engaging in predatory pricing and anti-competitive behaviour’ (van Zyl, 
2016). While the case was unsuccessful due to the Association due members failing to prove 
that Uber was a dominant actor in the market, it did highlight the plight that the service was 
in while contending in the taxicab landscape of the country. Uber has also had to contend 
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with various incidents of violence towards Uber driver-partners and Uber users around the 
country. Various violent attacks have taken place around metered taxi hotbeds such as 
Gautrain stations in the Rosebank and Sandton suburbs of Johannesburg, along with 
passenger threats occurring in Cape Town (van Zyl, 2016). The fear of violence has 
prompted Uber drivers to amend certain routes, as Phillip explained; 
 
‘I tend to not drive past there [Gautrain Stations in Johannesburg]. If I do, I drive on 
the furthest lane possible. If I have a client that is at the station, I must call them and 
ask them to walk outside so we can meet somewhere else. We often meet at places 
where these metered guys cant see’.  
 
Metered Taxi Operators initially claimed to want that Uber required to have the same taxicab 
permits as other operators, claiming they were operating illegally and putting their 
livelihoods at risk.  
 
Facing pressure and impending violence, Cabinet and Parliament in South Africa passed a 
bill in July 2016 that required Uber driver-partners to have metered taxi permits to operate in 
all South African cities that Uber has operations in (van Zyl, 2016). The implications of the 
regulation created the space for traffic authorities to impound vehicles of Uber drivers who 
did not have metered taxi permits. In a report issued by parliament, ongoing violence and 
tension between Uber and their metered taxi counterparts was cited as a prominent 
reason for passing the bill, ‘The regulation comes in the wake of protests by metered taxi 
operators concerned about Uber’s operations, including that it is not licensed’ it was said in 
the report (van Zyl, 2016). The logistics of the regulatory bill, which included merely paying 
a yearly levy to acquire a permit, seemed to have little effect on both the supply of drivers 
and the revenue generated by the service in the country. Alon Lits, General Manager for Uber 
in Sub-Saharan Africa welcomed what he claimed were ‘tough’ regulations for Uber drivers 
in the country, explaining that it was a productive step in regulation catching up with the pace 
of technology. However, the new bill did little to quell tensions between metered taxi drivers 
and Uber drivers, with more incidents of violence and intimidation reported at various 
shopping districts in both Johannesburg and Cape Town along with airport routes. The 
apparent bone of contention was not Uber’s regulatory eligibility, but the existence of Uber 
itself in the country. Metered taxi operators, facing a severe decline in customers and waning 
infrastructure, called for Uber to be done away with completely in the country. This 
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sentiment was perhaps indicative of the effect that the Sharing economy has had on global 
industries. Uber’s disruption of the metered taxi industry in South Africa is an example of the 
sharing economy’s global impact in the 21st century. Labour relations, as seen from metered 
taxi drivers in South Africa, have soured as Uber drivers have faced increasingly unsafe 
conditions and increased levels of driver precarity 
 
Uber is a prominent service that has internalised the general practices of the sharing economy 
in its business model. The sharing economy, and its basis are explored in this section as a 
precursor to unearthing the precarity that the service creates for drivers through its business 
model. The first point of departure is the argument that credits the sharing economy to a 
theory of flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1990). 
 
Part II:  The Sharing Economy 
The spread of capital beyond domestic boundaries due to globalisation, and the proliferation 
of the Internet as a means of sharing information, has seen the rise of more flexible and 
specialised organisations. These organisations, offering specialised goods and services to a 
greater scale of society, have seen mass-production making way for a mode of production 
defined as flexible accumulation. It will be argued that the sharing economy’s origins can be 
traced to the rise of flexible accumulation. To illustrate this argument, a review of sharing 
economy literature will be made, drawing on links to flexible accumulation. This will set the 
context for Uber and its specific business model. 
 
2.7. Literature: The Web & Disruption 
 
The sharing economy can be defined as a collection of software platforms that essentially act 
an intermediary between private buyers and private sellers – both of whom could be deemed 
to be peers in the sharing economy, allowing them to share their existing resources, goods or 
services. The sharing economy has given birth to large companies that have systematically 
transformed traditional industries. The functionality of the sharing economy is perhaps best 
personified through three companies. Ride-sharing service Uber, acts as an intermediary 
between leasers of private cars and potential customers, Airbnb acts in the same capacity to 
connect owners of accommodation to potential tenants, while Facebook acts as a platform 
from which users can create content and media for share. The origins of the sharing economy 
can be understood to be a complex web of social and economic phenomena, resulting in the 
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digitisation of commerce coupled with the culture of peer-based sharing. Of the many 
accounts on the origins of the sharing economy, two notable scholars whom have given the 
subject attention are Juho Hamari (2014) and Arjun Sundararajan (2016). Both rightfully 
attribute the sharing economy to the evolution of technology and society albeit articulating 
the respective evolutions trough different lenses 
 
Sundararajan explains how the sharing economy has emerged from three technical 
developments. These three developments including the ability to render physical items such 
as currency, music and manufacturing processes as digital information. Second, the existence 
of increasingly powerful and compact hardware and third, the spread of modular software 
applications that build on each other (Sundararajan, 2016). Hamari explains how the sharing 
economy is essentially born from the interface of four separate phenomena, namely, online 
collaboration, social commerce, the notion of sharing online and changing consumer 
ideology. Hamari explains how the Web 2.0 era has increase the amount of user generated 
content and the way information is created and consumed online. Online social commerce 
through peer-to-peer interactions have proliferated through the growth of social media 
platforms, allowing for information technology to be used a vehicle in which to entrench a 
new consumer ideology of sharing both information, through status updates and links and 
importantly goods and services (Hamari, 2014). Hamari and Sundararajan both credit the 
emergence of the sharing economy to one or more developments of information technology, 
specifically the evolution of the Internet and the worldwide web. It would be a necessary step 
to provide a brief background on how the Internet has morphed into the principle vehicle for 
the sharing economy. The worldwide web, its successor Web 2.0 and the disruptive 
technologies that are used as an apparatus of sharing through the sharing economy would be a 
useful departure of exploration.  
 
The development of the Internet has been a global phenomenon that has systematically 
catapulted the world into a new age narrated by technologically transmitted information. The 
development of Web 2.0, which is a term given to describe the second generation of the 
World Wide Web and is focused on the ability for people to collaborate and share 
information online, has sparked a new cohort of companies that aim to maximise the 
functionality of the internet and monetise the way people consume, and produce, the internet 
(O’Reilly, 2007). The Web 2.0 evolution of the Internet has given rise to online platforms 
that promote user-generated, peer-produced content, which is subsequently shared between 
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one or more users. These platforms are often compartmentalised according to the type of 
content shared and created, with notable examples being that of video sharing site YouTube 
launched in 2005, image sharing platform Instagram launched in 2010, crowd-funding and 
micro-financing platforms such GoFundMe and Kickstarter, launched in 2009 and 2010 
respectively (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Whilst the sharing platforms are integral into the 
rise of the sharing economy, they cover minor terrain into the ethos and potential of the 
sharing economy. The sharing economy, at its core, emerges from several technological 
developments that have simplified sharing of both physical and non-physical goods and 
services through the availability of information systems housed on the internet (Hamari, 
Sjoklint & Ukkonen, 2015). As such, a deeper inquiry into the preconditions to the World 
Wide Web and Web 2.0 would be integral to unpacking the sharing economy at its core. 
 
The World Wide Web, commonly known as the Web (and referred to as that herein), can be 
described as a universe of global network-accessible information – a space in which people 
can interact and is primarily populated by interlinked pages of text, images and animation 
with occasional sounds, three dimensional words and videos (Berners-lee, 1996). Whilst 
popularly used as a synonym for the Internet itself, it is merely a platform that powered by 
the Internet, very much like electronic mail (e-mail). While the creation of the web was a 
seminal catalyst for the way in which the Internet could be used for the proliferation of 
information, it is in the second generation of the web, commonly referred to as ‘web 2.0’, 
where the web would become a platform in which human beings could share and create 
content, services and media on a mass scale. The term Web 2.0, coined in 1999 by 
information architecture consultant Darcy DiNucci in her article ‘Fragmented Future’, 
described the second generation of the web as a platform that emphasised user-generated 
content, in the form of websites, that could function on other products, systems and devices 
(DiNucci, 1999). While the original advent of the web emphasised mere viewing of 
webpages, the second generation of the web would allow users, who aren't computer 
scientists and web developers by trade, to create content on the internet and share it with 
other end users. Web 2.0 does not refer to a change in the technical characteristics of the 
Web, but rather the changing way in which the web is designed and used. The rise of social 
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter along with social media sites such as 
YouTube and Vimeo can all be attributed to the second generation of the web, along with 
mobile phone based ‘applications’ popularised by the launch of the Apple iPhone and its 
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virtual application market place App Store launched in 2007. Interestingly, DiNucci 
foreshadowed the evolution of sharing on Web 2.0 in her article, writing:  
 
‘the web we now know, which loads into a browser window, in essential static   
screenfuls, is only an embryo of the Web to come. The first glimmerings of Web 2.0 
are beginning to appear, and we are just starting to see how that embryo might 
develop. The Web will be understood not as screenfuls of text and graphics but as a 
transport mechanism, the ether through which interactivity happens. It will appear on 
your computer screen, on your television set, your car dashboard, your cell phone, 
hand-held game machines, maybe even your microwave oven’ (DiNucci, 1999: 32).  
 
The prediction, made in 1999, would be vindicated in the following two decades. DiNucci’s 
forecasting had an especially apt observation of the Web’s impending colonisation on other 
technological devices such as appliances, gaming platforms and especially cell phone 
devices. The birth of the cell phone, and its subsequent successor, the smart phone, would 
become a critical linkage between the web and the rise of the sharing economy. It would also 
become the centrepiece of operationalising services such as Uber and other companies 
operating within the sharing economy. Technology, linked industry with the new sharing 
economy. This linkage only occurred through favourable economic conditions of a changing 
world. A world that was characterised by a new mode of capitalist production that utilised 
technology more than before, a mode of production defined as flexible accumulation. This 
mode of capitalist production created conditions that were favourable for the rise of the 
sharing economy and the birth of a company such as Uber. With increased product 
specialisation, informalisation of labour, and increased forms of portable labour management 
– flexible accumulation is a vital cog in the axis that holds the sharing economy together.  
 
2.8. Sharing Economy as Flexible Accumulation 
 
As previously stated, the sharing economy’s origins can be traced to the rise of flexible 
accumulation, a theory popularised by David Harvey. The spread of capital beyond domestic 
boundaries due to globalisation and the proliferation of the Internet as a means of sharing 
information has seen the rise of more flexible and specialised organisations. These 
organisations, offer specialised goods and services to a greater scale of society, with mass-
production making way for flexibility. As such, organisations and individuals have been able 
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to offer specific and specialised services – creating an economy of sharing. The sharing 
economy itself, while having its origins in flexible accumulation, has morphed into a 
marketplace tailor made for individuals rather than large-scale organisations. Industries 
because of this new form of capitalist accumulation have seen the informalisation of work 
and the culling of employees worldwide (Harvey, 1990). It is in the process of 
informalisation, that being the use of labour on a temporary or short-term basis, that Uber 
fames its business model. It is perhaps most aptly encompassed in Uber’s employee 
classification of ‘independent contractors’ rather than employees.  
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided substantive background into the evolution of the taxi industry 
along with the technological disruption that the sharing economy has created. The initial 
emergence of traditional taxicabs in the United Kingdom and the United States explored 
through the work of Wong (2008), Russell & Hodges (2009) and McArdle (2012), has been 
argued as creating the universal framework in which the global taxicab industry functions 
today. Furthermore, the birth of taxi regulation, with its premises based on controlling driver 
wages and quality of service, has been argued as being a key facet of the taxicab industry. 
Key examples of London’s ‘The Knowledge’ and New York’s ‘Medallion systems’ have 
been used to accentuate the importance and salience of regulation. The disruption caused by 
the sharing economy around the globe, in consultation with Hamari (2014) and DiNucci 
(1999), has been argued to provide a basis in which ride-sharing Uber has penetrated the 
taxicab landscape of the world. In this regard, David Harvey’s theory on Flexible 
Accumulation (1990) has been mobilised in assessing how Uber has informalised work in the 
taxicab industry. This informalisation, is argued to direct lead to driver precarity in regard to 
Uber. Precarity, in its various forms, will be argued to exist in key facets of Uber’s business 
model in the following chapter. This chapter will mobilise empirical data ascertained from 
fieldwork to accentuate the argument of precarity. 
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Chapter 3 – Uber: Modelling Labour Precarity 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter fully develops the argument that Uber’s labour conditions place drivers in a 
position of precarity. The argument comprises of three distinct sections that use the empirical 
data gathered throughout the research paper to address three areas in which precarity exists in 
Uber’s business model. This empirical data operates in conjunction with Guy Standing’s 
theory on precarity (2011) for its overarching hypothesis regarding Uber’s precarity-creating 
business model. The first section argues that ‘dynamic pricing’ increases work hours and 
decreases wage. In this regard, literature by Chen, Mislove & Wilson (2015) on labour and 
dynamic pricing, along with work on supply and demand conditions by Chen & Sheldon 
(2015) is mobilised to support the argument. This is argued as precarious due to a decrease in 
a driver’s income security and work security in the greater framework of labour market 
security. The second section hypothesises that Uber’s ‘independent contractor’ status is both 
misleading in the global south and results in decreased representation security, income 
security and employment security as it relates to the precarity criterion developed by Guy 
Standing (2011). In support of this argument, legislative documents such as the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act in South Africa (1997) and David Harvey’s theorisation on 
informalised labour is utilised. The third section argues that Uber’s rating system increases 
precarity through the reduction of employment security of drivers. Foucault’s theory of 
Panopticism (1975) is consulted to accentuate the control that Uber is argued to enjoy over 
drivers in through its rating system. Furthermore, Hochschild’s theory on emotional labour 
(1983) is used to illustrate that the employment insecurity the rating system creates evokes a 
‘management of feeling’ from drivers as they exhibit emotional labour in the work place.  
 
3.2. Uber’s Fare System: The Model 
 
Uber’s fare system has roots both in the surface shift of capitalism in the 1970s as explained 
by David Harvey’s ‘flexible accumulation’, which describes a new mode of production that 
uses technology as an apparatus to change production based on current demand and supply 
conditions. In the first instance, flexible accumulation states that today’s companies use 
information technology to change the characteristics of goods produced as well as to analyse 
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data to order suppliers and produce goods that are congruent to current demand flaws. Uber’s 
dynamic pricing model, which changes fare-prices based on current supply and demand 
patterns is a direct descendent of flexible accumulation. In a similar vein, Uber’s constant 
monitoring of the supply of drivers and demand patterns to the service is directly due to the 
rise of information technology acting as e-management purveyors, or information 
Panopticons as theorised by Zuboff (1988).  A closer look at Uber’s fare model will develop 
these ideas further and locate the argument that its model creates decreased labour market 
security for drivers.  
 
Uber charges customers based on a distance covered and time elapsed nexus. Fares range 
between R7 to R10 per kilometre covered, with an additional R1 per minute charge (Uber, 
2016). On an initial level, the fare for each Uber trip is typically split 20% and 80% between 
Uber and driver partner respectively, with the former receiving 20% and the latter 80% of the 
trip fare. Of the $1 billion worth of bookings in 2015, Uber generated revenues of $213 
million (Guidero, 2016). The 80% of each respective trip is deemed to be the share received 
from the relationship that the driver partner has with Uber as a service. As such, the proceeds 
that a driver partner generates from his/her trips are used as an income that would in theory 
cover the driver-partner’s operating costs. These overheads could include; vehicle 
repayments, insurance premiums, cellular contract and data rates, fuel and general vehicle 
maintenance along with providing sustainable wage for the driver partner from month to 
month. However, this pricing model is not static, but rather moulds to the current supply and 
demand conditions.  
 
During times of high demand, Uber uses its smartphone based application as an information 
panopticon to administer a ‘surge multiplier’ to increase prices. A causal example of this 
‘surge multiplier’ coming into play would be in a scenario where supply decreases, that being 
the number of drivers not accepting trip requests, and the demand increases, that being the 
number of uses attempting to book a ride, resulting in Uber failing to form an equilibrium. 
Uber thus begins to weigh expectation with fairness as it changes production in real-time, 
assessing how Users expected Uber’s prices to be fair to them, while assessing how its prices 
expect to be fair to drivers. In this instance, the solution thus becomes increasing the average 
trip fare price, where users are supplied with drivers and drivers are supplied with the 
requisite rate to operate (Chen, Mislove & Wilson, 2015). Uber provides two justifications 
for its surge-pricing model; first it reduces demand by pricing some customers out of the 
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market, thus reducing the wait times for the remaining customers. Second, surge pricing 
increases profits for drivers, thus incentivising more people to drive during times of high 
demand (ibid). Chen explores this model of surge-pricing, providing commentary on the way 
Uber administers it, Chen explains: 
 
‘The key difference between Uber and other sharing economy marketplaces is that 
Uber is a Black box: they do not provide data about supply and demand, and surge 
multipliers are set by an opaque algorithm. This lack of transparency has led to 
concerns that Uber may artificially manipulate surge prices to increase profits, as well 
as apprehension about the fairness of surge pricing’ (Chen, Mislove & Wilson, 
2015:1). 
 
Chen also further notes the unintended consequences of the surge model, explaining ‘these 
concerns were exacerbated when Uber was forced to publically apologise and refund rides 
after prices surged during Hurricane Sandy and the Sydney hostage crisis’ (ibid). On the 
inverse, the surge-pricing model is only one side of Uber’s ‘Dynamic Pricing Model’, Uber’s 
trip fares tend to decrease when the demand is low. An example of such a scenario was 
Uber’s price cut during June and July in its South Africa territory, specifically to the major 
cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Alon Lits, general manager for Uber in Sub-
Saharan Africa, stated that the price cuts would benefit drivers specifically. The price cut was 
due to an expected decrease in demand as Lits intimated that consumers in the country tended 
to venture out less in the winter months (Anetos, 2016). The price decrease saw resistance 
from certain quarters of the company’s driver-partner fraternity, who argued that the decrease 
caused a decrease in their average wage. The argument made by aggrieved drivers, holds 
congruence with the hypothesis that the general practice of dynamic pricing creates precarity. 
This precarity, and its nature, is developed further in the next section.  
 
3.2.1. Precarity as an Implication 
 
Chen & Sheldon, explain how in many markets, ‘new technologies allow traditional jobs to 
be divided into discrete tasks that are widely distributed across workers and dynamically 
priced given prevailing supply and demand conditions’ (Chen & Sheldon, 2015: 2). These 
new technologies, such as Uber’s smartphone application, allow fares to be changed based on 
the amount of people in demand of a ride or the number of drivers available. Senzo, a 
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respondent in the study, explains the quick nature of these fare changes; 
‘Generally, if you drive around Nasrec [South of Johannesburg] when there is soccer 
or Rugby, you experience a lot of trip requests from customers…. It’s crazy 
sometimes, man. Once you see an arrow shooting up on your phone, that’s when you 
know [that surge pricing has been implemented]. I think it only lasts if there are many 
people. Sometimes I have seen surge for only five minutes. Sometimes its on for two 
hours, depends on drivers. If we all drive to that location then there won’t be surge, 
but if maybe there is three or four guys there, they will increase the price for clients’  
These sudden changes in income on the whims of their being a big concert at FNB Stadium 
or a lack of people outdoors during the brisk months of a Johannesburg winter, can all change 
the trip fares and as a result the amount of income an Uber driver, or driver-partner generates. 
With Uber administering a price reduction in South Africa during the Winter months of 2016, 
respondents were asked how this affected their incomes, and ancillary to that, their prevailing 
work hours. Phillip, asserted that the price decrease affected him initially: 
‘At first, we didn’t really understand why there was a price cut, man. We are used to 
it going up sometimes [in periods of increased demand for service]. I think they said 
they told us on e-mail, but many guys don’t really look out for that. So there was 
confusion and some guys weren’t happy’ 
Phillip illustrated that a breakdown in communication between drivers and Uber made the 
price change difficult to understand and stomach. The effects of the price cut would be of 
significant interest. Justice, explained; 
‘We just needed to wake up more, find more clients. What they didn’t think about is 
that petrol didn’t decrease when they cut the prices, when price increased we had to 
work longer because we made less money. Some guys must also pay their bosses the 
same target every week, so the price cut affected us.  
Justice’s intimation on the price of living not decreasing with the price of Uber fares pointed 
to the growing income insecurity and precarity that was associated with dynamic pricing. 
Uber’s dynamic pricing, is not congruent with the pricing structure of the essential items that 
are needed for drivers to survive. This discrepancy, leaves drivers in a precarious positon.  
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David, who explained that he was not an Uber driver at the period of the price cut, 
empathised with the service and the drivers respectively; 
‘Obviously, they wanted more people to call Uber, they were thinking that many 
people would request more rides with us, but I don’t think that happened. But also, I 
think they tried to help drivers who lost money. I think some of the guys got 
compensated by Uber if they drove enough.’ 
Michael, also explained that Uber compensated drivers who hadn’t reached a certain amount 
of money on an hourly basis. However, drivers also had to have completed a certain number 
of trips within that hour – which inevitably caused an increase in the density of work on 
average as the average resting time inevitably dwindled:  
‘They told us if we completed three or four trips an hour, they would fill in whatever 
we would lose. Let’s say if normally I make R300 in three trips, and now I make 
R220 because of the price cut, they said they would give us the rest [R80]. But man, if 
it’s a Wednesday at 11 in the morning, there is no way you are making three trips in 
an hour. Those times are quiet. So, if it is quiet, you don’t get [compensated] from 
Uber’ 
Dynamic pricing relies on a speculation onto the perceived increase in supply of customers 
through price incentivising. This speculation, using the smartphone application as its 
information panopticon, would then change fare pricing (Zuboff, 1988). However, most of 
the respondents explained that the number of clients they had during the price-cut period 
remain relatively unchanged, without the surge in clients that Uber initially expected. Phillip 
explained; 
‘I don’t think the number of clients went up. People in Joburg just don’t like 
travelling when it’s cold. I didn’t really notice an increase, the only thing that changed 
was how much guys worked. You see guy’s parked at garages sleeping for maybe an 
hour then going back to work. It was tough.’  
The direct implication of this was an increase in work hours and subsequent fatigue. This 
mis-calibration of outcomes between Uber and real life demand and supply conditions caused 
tension among drivers who saw their precarious position grow. As a result, Uber drivers 
illustrated a show of resistance as they held strikes, the most prominent of which was at 
 42 
Uber’s Greenpoint office in Cape Town. About two hundred Uber drivers ceased work and 
hosted a march to Uber’s office in the city, with Uber cutting the tariffs from R7 per 
kilometre to R6 (Prinsloo, 2016). Uber subsequently halted the price cut in August and 
returned to regular fare pricing (ibid). The restoration of regular fare price levels, was 
perhaps the biggest indictment into the speculative nature of dynamic pricing – a negative by-
product resulting in Chen’s ‘black box’ theorisation on the price model’s unknown 
algorithms. However, while one can deduce that the price cut period increased the average 
work hours of drivers, it can not be deduced whether their income levels were higher or lower 
than they would have been without the price cut in the seasonal period of low-demand.  
In conclusion, the data deduces that the dynamic pricing model that Uber implements, based 
on periodic supply and demand conditions, has a direct effect on the density of work a 
respective driver needs to render to reach a certain income level that is considered adequate. 
Based on the responses given in the study, two outcomes are generated. First, dynamic 
pricing, specifically price-cutting in periods of seasonally low demand, increases work-hours 
on average as drivers need to attain more clients to reach the same amount of revenue they 
are used to. Secondly, these price-cuts do not substantively increase the demand for the Uber 
service in Johannesburg, which results in a net-loss of income for drivers considering 
periodic fuel price increases and vehicle maintenance costs. The eventualities of the evidence 
point to precarity in two forms. First, drivers lose income security as their wages and 
demands on the job change while on shift, with supply and demand conditions constantly 
influencing the stability and protection of their income levels (Standing, 2011). Secondly, and 
perhaps the cause of the first form of precarity, is one of a lack of representation security. The 
lack of representation security, which according to Standing would mean representation in 
the labour market in the form of unions, means that Uber drivers are unable to bargain against 
dynamic pricing and the income deficit that respondents claim it evokes (ibid). This non-
existence of representation security, is argued to be a result of the general climate created by 
flexible accumulation as a mode of capitalist production (Harvey, 1989). The informalisation 
of labour into small-segmented groups decreases the efficacy of trade union building.  
A further foray into the Uber experience is useful as a means of addressing the second section 
of the argument presented in the study. In the next section, Uber drivers are examined closer, 
with emphasis given to the way they are sourced by Uber and classified by the company.  
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3.3. The ‘Independent Contractor’ Status: The Model 
 
The following section takes an in-depth analysis into the implications of Uber classifying 
their drivers as ‘independent contractors’. It is argued that these drivers are misclassified, 
which is supported by detailing that some drivers operate for third party fleet owners and are 
thus in reality employees in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997. It is 
argued that the implication of this misclassification is that drivers are precarious because of 
having to divide their earnings with Uber and the third-party fleet owner, creating income 
insecurity as per Guy Standing’s labour market security theory. Furthermore, it is argued that 
this misclassification also creates employment insecurity due to a lack of protection against 
arbitrary dismissal by fleet owners. The first point of departure in this section is through 
providing a profile of the specific drivers that were mobilised and interviewed for this study, 
and in particular their backgrounds and reasoning behind joining the service. The driver 
profile will give context to closely analysing Uber’s training and recruitment process along 
with unearthing the precarious nature of Uber’s ‘independent contractor’ status of classifying 
drivers.  
3.3.1. Drivers Pre-Uber experiences 
 
All the interviewed driver-partners were black African males, whose ages ranged from 24 to 
40. Six of the eight respondents explained that they hailed from various regions of South 
Africa, two of which explaining that they were originally from the KwaZulu-Natal province, 
one hailing from the Eastern Cape and three other driver-partners did not disclose where 
specifically in South Africa they hailed from, with the two remaining revealing that they were 
from neighbouring Zimbabwe. The employment history of the eight respondents was varied 
in industry. One respondent, ‘David’, explained  
‘I used to work in the retail space. I was a part-time merchandiser at Game. I left that 
so I was just looking for something else to do because I also had to leave college, so I 
heard about Uber through a friend. I looked it up on the web and decided to give it a 
try’, ‘you’re my third client, I started last night’  
Another driver-partner, ‘Senzo’, explained how he used to be in the delivery industry;  
‘I’ve been driving for a long time. I used to deliver for British American Tobacco. 
Some guys would get robbed, these guys, they want money – [there is] lots of money 
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in Tobacco. I heard about Uber because a friend of mine is already driving for them’.  
One respondent, Sthembiso, came from an existing taxicab service in Johannesburg; 
‘I used to drive clients strictly from Sandton to other parts of Joburg. Drop them off, 
and then drive back to Sandton. I decided to join Uber because then I wouldn’t waste 
petrol, you know? I could make money going there and back instead of making 
money just going one-way’. ‘I make a lot more now since I joined Uber three months 
ago’  
Sthembiso highlighted the opportunities that Uber provides him with its disruptive 
technology. Its technology, in the form of the smartphone application, prevented him from 
floating or cruising too much on the roads without occupants in his vehicle due the 
technology constantly scouring the sharing economy for new leasers to his service. In the 
wake of Uber’s technological lure, the process of applying for Uber was the next step to 
becoming a fully-fledged ‘independent contractor’. A closer analysis into the process of 
applying for the service and its recruitment process brings the ambiguity behind Uber’s driver 
classification into spotlight. 
3.3.2. Applying to become an Uber Driver 
 
Uber commonly refers to the labour that carries out the transportation process as ‘driver 
partners’. While this may be a term that evokes a sense of reciprocity and relative warmth 
between the said partner and Uber as a service, a closer look at the recruitment process will 
elucidate a different picture. A browse of Uber’s official website’s recruitment page is 
highlighted with three bold taglines for prospective drivers; ‘Make good money’, ‘Drive 
when you want’, ‘No office, no boss’ (Uber, 2016). Applying to be ‘your own boss’ is carried 
out on the same disruptive technology that it sources customers, a smartphone based 
application. The smartphone-based application enables consumers and driver-partners to 
locate one another within the nexus of the sharing economy. Furthermore, the application 
also gains a driver entry into partnering with Uber (Gloss, McGregor & Brown, 2016). Once 
the smartphone application is downloaded on a prospective driver’s smartphone, he or she 
must adhere to Uber’s requirements of entry. A skim of Uber’s published online driver 
requirements illuminate what a driver needs to partner with Uber. The services online portal 
states; ‘Requirements vary by city, but there are a few minimum requirements: Possess a 
valid South African Professional driving permit (PrDP); Complete a safety screening; Pass a 
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driving evaluation’ (Uber, 2017). Furthermore, Uber also has separate vehicle requirements 
to work for the service, which include:  
 
‘A working radio; air conditioning; four doors; A vehicle of 2013 or newer; [a] 
commercial vehicle insurance with passenger liability; operator’s card; vehicle 
inspection report; certificate of registration; operators permit from the department of 
transport’ (ibid). 
 
The demarcations for entering the Uber platform are encompassed in these requirements. 
Once these requirements are met, driver training is held at Uber’s Johannesburg office based 
in Parktown North. Sthembiso, highlighted this process: 
 
‘They first tell you some of the things you can’t really do when you’re driving. They 
tell you to stick to the speed limit on all roads – sometimes customers don’t like this 
because they think we drive too slow, you know. They also tell you some of the 
things you can and can’t talk about. Things like religion and politics are stuff we can’t 
talk about. Maybe things like sport is cool to speak about’ 
 
As Sthembiso asserts, upon applying to be a driver, Uber’s training process is based largely 
on shaping a driver’s behavioural and physical actions. Moulding them in a way that is 
palatable to the service. The act of emotional labour is subtly placed into the awareness of 
drivers, with Uber’s training regimen introducing a level of emotional regulation. Emotional 
regulation here is described as the automatic or controlled process of influencing specific 
dimensions of their emotions (Hochschild, 1983: 10). The emotional labour, it is argued, is 
but a mere symptom of the greater precarity that Uber will present the driver once his training 
is complete and he is on the road.  
  
3.3.3. Driving for Uber: An Ambiguous Employment Status 
 
Uber ‘leases’ its customer network and thus creates a ‘partnership’ between driver and 
service through its smartphone application, where there is a collaboration of revenue 
generation. In theory, Drivers render their vehicles and time to transport customers and Uber 
provides these customers. Driver partners thus in theory create their own operation schedules 
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and are deemed to be ‘independent contractors’ working on a continuous temporary contract 
with Uber which is effected only during trips. The premise behind this methodology of 
Uber’s recruitment process is argued to echo the central tenets of David Harvey’s flexible 
accumulation theory. Uber’s temporary leasing of drivers and forming strategic ‘partnerships’ 
with drivers is but an embellished form of informalising labour. What this includes, as can be 
seen with the example of Uber, is the compartmentalising of labour into groups of skill-
flexible and temporary segments for specialised production. Driver partners here are 
compartmentalised to serve the purpose of driving their vehicles in a specialised manner 
(Harvey, 1989). However, this compartmentalisation often leaves labour, and in this case 
drivers, relatively disposable and precarious. A further exploration into the ambiguity of 
Uber’s employee status illustrates this.  
 
As stated, Uber does not provide the vehicles in which trips are administered, but merely act 
as an intermediary between consumer and producer as per the sharing economy’s basic 
premise. In theory, driver-partners own their cars as the ‘tools’ they use for their trade. This, 
as Uber states, renders driver-partners as ‘independent contractors’ or ‘self-employed’. It 
would be interesting to compare the definitional nature of the employee status that Uber 
attaches to drivers along with definition of South Africa’s department of Labour. An 
independent contractor, as per the Internal Revenue Service of the United States, the country 
from which Uber was founded, is a person who fulfils the following criteria:  
First, the worker supplies his or her own equipment, materials and tools. 
Second, all the necessary materials are not supplied by employer. Third, the 
worker controls the hours of employment thus indicating they are acting with 
autonomy in the work place (IRS, 2016). 
 As such, with driver-partners in theory using their own vehicles and smartphones as their 
fundamental materials of trade, along with dictating their own hours of operation, it is a 
realistic claim to render them as independent contractors. However, taking a closer look at 
the South African context, through the findings of this research, a driver’s employment status 
grows blurrier.  
Of the eight drivers interviewed during fieldwork, three respondents, Michael, Sthembiso and 
Justice revealed that they owned the vehicles they drove - while the remainder drove through 
a fleet owner. One of them, David, explained:  
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‘They [the fleet owner] give you targets generally. For example, my guy has a whole 
fleet and he’s got quite a few guys working for him’ ‘So by every Monday, we must 
make a certain amount of money and give it to the owner. After that we get paid from 
the target. He pays us every month, but weekly the boss gives us money for petrol and 
data for the phone. He also gives us the phone’  
David’s revelation would be a common thread between five of the respondents, who all 
mentioned having to reach ‘targets’ on the trips or referring to their ‘bosses’ when asked 
about the origin of the vehicles. Muzi, explained the relationship he had with his fleet owner, 
‘these bosses, they want money man... I make her [the vehicles owner] a lot of money, man. 
She went to Mozambique a few months ago’. Another respondent, justice, explained that he 
had made the transition from driving for someone else to having his own vehicle: 
‘I used to [drive for someone else]… but when you realise how much money you 
make for the owners and you see what you get, it doesn't add up man. I know how 
much I bring to the table. I know how much money I can make and have been making 
for other people. I had to try get my own car, man’.  
What was interesting about Justice’s assertion along with the other respondents who drove 
for other partners, was that there would inevitably be an excess that was given to the partners, 
almost a rental fee for using their materials for trade (vehicles & smartphone). The general 
share of revenue in an Uber operation, and how it was designed by the company, is a bilateral 
one. With the Uber service taking 25% of a single fare, with the percentage being reduced to 
20% for users who have been active on the platform for a longer period, as revealed by one of 
the respondents. The pool of respondents thus are categorised into two groups. First, those 
that drove their own vehicles and tend to all the operating costs of being a driver partner such 
as vehicle maintenance and smartphone connection, and the second group being that of 
respondents who used the vehicles of fleet owners. In order to further explore the nature of 
fleet owners, an interview was conducted a fleet owner who explained the rationale and 
operational mechanisms related to being a driver-manager.  
3.3.4. Employment Misclassification Creating Precarity  
 
An additional interview was held to delve deeper into the relationship between a driver and a 
fleet owner, who was emerging as a proverbial ‘middle-man’ in Johannesburg’s Uber 
practices. ‘Trevor’, a fleet owner and by default driver-partner was interviewed for the 
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purposes of this research. Trevor owned an undisclosed number of vehicles in which all of 
which were driven by employed drivers. He explained: 
‘We [he and his business partner who was not present at the interview] primarily want 
to help these guys out – give them something to do. We supply them with the cars 
which all have petrol cards, and iPhones… We also give them weekly targets and 
evaluate them from there generally.’  
Trevor further explained that there would be a monetary target that Drivers would need to 
achieve on a weekly basis, an amount made above that figure would presumably be factored 
into the remuneration of drivers and a figure below on the inverse would prove to be 
detrimental for the driver. He noted: 
‘We generally pay the drivers and pay for the car servicing and petrol and all that 
before we take anything for ourselves. That’s just how we work. The routine could be 
different with different car owners’. 
What could be concluded with Trevor’s interview and the general theme of working under 
fleet owners was that this put Uber’s ‘independent contractor’ status into spotlight, along 
with the inevitable heightened sense of control that the driver came under having to manage 
the panoptic mechanisms of Uber’s performance evaluation through rating systems coupled 
with target-based performance measures enacted by fleet owners. The existence of fleet 
owners like Trevor, it is argued, results in the employment status of Uber drivers being 
misclassified. The misclassification comes when drivers fail to be classified as ‘employees’ 
and as a result not enjoying employee benefits. The eventuality of this misclassification is a 
heightened labour market insecurity categorised by increased levels of employment 
insecurity and income insecurity as pay sharing increases and chances of arbitrary dismissal 
grow. Empirical document analysis will accentuate the validity of this argument. 
There is no tangible definition of what an ‘independent contractor’ is in South Africa’s labour 
legislation, however one can use this legislation to determine what an independent contractor 
is not. I will use this process of elimination to determine if Johannesburg’s Uber drivers who 
drive through fleet owners are indeed independent contractors. Section 1 of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act defines an employee as:     
‘Any person excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person, or 
 49 
for the state, and who receives, or is entitled to receive any remuneration and any 
other person who, in any manner, assists in carrying or conducting the business of an 
employer” (BCEA, 1997: 4)’. 
One could assume that the five respondents that didn’t drive their own vehicles were thus not 
independent contractors according to the BCEA document, but are rather employees. They A. 
work for another person, and B. assist in carrying or conducting the business of an employer. 
The employer in this regard would thus become the fleet owner.  However, Section 83 A of 
the BCEA, further elaborates on defining what an employee is. It explains that employee 
status is a presumptive matter, explaining that a person is presumed an employee until the 
contrary is proved regardless of the form of the contract. This document states that a person is 
an employee if any one or more of these factors are present:    
‘i) The way the person works is subject to the control or direction of another person. 
ii) The person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person. iv) The person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 
hours per month over the last three months. V) The person is economically dependent 
on the other person for whom that person works or renders services. VI) The person is 
provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person (BCEA, 1997: 
40). 
The status of drivers who drive for fleet owners here becomes illuminating. They are 
presumed employees because they fill the category. The drivers are thus deemed to not enjoy 
their rightful employee benefits through the fleet-owner, such as annual leave for continuous 
service and weekly rest days among other rights (BCEA, 1997). Some respondents explained 
that have worked seven days a week in some instances and have heard of peers working 
similar hours. Furthermore, the issue of Precarity also comes into spotlight. Guy Standing’s 
labour-related security criteria of Precarity discussed in an earlier section of this paper, I 
would argue, would render these drivers in a position of Precarity. The premise behind this is 
that drivers in Johannesburg who work for fleet owners, over and above being misclassified 
and being liable to certain privileges, are precarious in the sense that they suffer from a lack 
of A. employment security (due to the potential of being arbitrarily dismissed by fleet 
owners), B. Income security (the lack of a stable income due to Uber’s dynamic pricing 
model coupled with having to give a portion of their income to their fleet owners), and C. 
Representation security (there is no existing union for Uber drivers in Johannesburg to assists 
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in collective bargaining) (Standing, 2011). 
A further elaboration of the third premise behind the argument that Drivers are precarious, 
their lack of Representation security, can also be articulated as being directly caused by a 
global trend. This trend would be seen in the erosion of unionisation due to the rise of 
flexible accumulation as a mode of capitalist production in the Post-Fordist era. David 
Harvey refers to flexible accumulation as the growing informalisation and de-unionisation of 
work, and the veering away from mass-produced capitalism (Harvey, 1989). In sum, this 
section argues Uber drivers operating under fleet-owners work informally due to their 
misclassification. This misclassification consequently results in a lack of collective 
bargaining for wages and better work conditions. Furthermore, Fleet-owners, along with 
Uber as a service, operate in producing small-batch segments of the transport industry, 
making use of flexible Accumulation’s model of easily disposable labour and ‘contracted’ 
workers.  Uber drivers, having to contend with heightened income and work security due to 
Uber’s dynamic pricing and employment status, are faced with the further burden of having 
to maintain stringent ‘rating’ averages. The ratings average will form the primary arc of the 
next section of this study, with the argument made that these ratings increase precarity in 
reducing the employment security of drivers.  
 
3.4. Uber Driver Ratings: Emotional Labour & Panoptic 
Management 
 
Uber’s rating system is argued as the main arc of Uber’s panoptic control over drivers. The 
rating system, used through a disruptive technology in the form of Uber’s smartphone, 
surveys drivers and their behaviour in ensuring the drivers adheres to Uber’s stringent 
‘control rules’. These rules comprise of having to maintain a 4,7 out of 5 stars rating. 
Furthermore, as Manual Castells points out, information technology is used as a medium 
from which people can communicate and function, with technology now acting as 
management Panopticons in the Uber process (Castells & Cardoso, 2005. The result of 
having the rating system as the proverbial panoptic structure in the Uber process, is the 
increase in reducing the employment security, and as a result evoking emotional labour. The 
first point of departure will be to analyse how Uber’s smartphone application acts as a 
mechanism of surveillance, followed by a broader discussion on how this application uses 
‘rating’ systems to create precarity.  
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3.4.1. Uber’s Surveillance: The Smartphone Application  
 
Uber’s smartphone-based application begins its advanced form of control over labour through 
the initial process of when a customer hails a ride. The emotional labour commences and the 
rigidity of being an Uber drivers has subtle beginnings. Once a trip is requested by customer, 
the next available driver-partner will be alerted and he will be asked by the application to 
accept the requested ride. If a driver rejects the trip, he is placed in the precarity of insecure 
work security. Work security here, as Standing explains, is defined as protection against 
illness and regulation on working time. If an Uber driver decides to reject a trip for the 
purposes of rest, he may be terminated by the Uber service. The implication is accentuated 
when Muzi, a participant in the research process explains: 
 
‘if you decide not to accept a client, they can disqualify you …You have to accept a 
certain number of trips otherwise they will think you are making your own private 
trips while online with them. So you can’t just relax for too long, man. They are 
always monitoring us’ 
 
Furthermore, Uber’s smartphone application subsequently provides the details of the driver 
partner to the consumer, which includes the driver-partners name and a photograph of the 
driver-partner (which is not always required by various Uber territories), the driver-partner’s 
vehicle model and the driver-partner’s registration number along with the driver partner’s 
average rating. The driver-partner will in turn be shown the name of the customer along with 
his or her own average rating before arriving to the location of the customer. The application 
also allows the customer and the driver-partner to liaise prior to the trip through a call 
function. Once the trip is underway, Uber calculates the fare based on the distance covered 
along with the duration of time taken to complete, with fare estimates being flexible based on 
the potential for traffic congestion. Uber’s smartphone application also creates the route to be 
used, with driver-partners able to tether their account with mapping services such as Google 
Maps, Apple Maps or Waze, the customer may also stipulate their own desired route. Once 
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the trip is concluded, the amount that the trip is worth is automatically deducted from the 
account that the specific user has tethered to their Uber account.  
 
The smartphone application, in the act of providing advanced transparency on the identity 
and contact details of both customer and driver – begins the process of panoptic surveillance 
and labour control. Information panopticon theory critiques how technological systems use 
transparency to assert power, control and authority. As such, Uber’s application and its route-
generation, binds the Uber driver to a constraint of direction. Uber makes use of GPS 
technology, embedded in its application, to assert power in relation to how trips are 
administered. Michael explains; that ‘they [Uber] can terminate you for using an ‘unnatural’ 
route, man. Some guys have been accused of talking to clients before so that they can take 
them at a certain time’. Michael’s assertions illustrate that Uber’s panoptic method of 
management and surveillance begins before the trip with a customer is even administered. 
However, it is in the trip itself where the rating system itself takes full effect. Here, the 
surveillance heightens as customers rate one’s experience of the driver following every trip.  
 
3.4.2. Driver ‘Ratings’ as a Mechanism for Precarity and Emotional Labour 
 
As discussed, Uber’s smartphone application allows both parties to rate one another’s trip 
experience after every ride. Furthermore, comments could be left by customers to critique or 
compliment the service that they would have received. Users and driver can rate one another 
on a scale of one star to five stars. The effects of this bilateral rating system on the driver-
partner were of interest throughout the research process. The most prominent finding in this 
regard was the fact that the rating system was used as a barometer of the performance of the 
Uber driver in question. David explained how drivers all had individual rating aggregates or 
averages, with this average being used by Uber as a measure of how effective each driver-
partner was. He explained: 
‘Basically if your rating is below I think about 4.6 or 4.7 stars out of 5, then they can 
terminate you after a while. I’m not quite sure what happens to these guys, apparently, 
you receive further training when you are terminated but I know of some guys that 
were terminated and never let back in’ 
In a document review of Uber’s published list of practices, the service explains the logic 
behind having these rating systems in place, stating; 
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‘This [the rating system] ensures that people riding with Uber continue to receive a 
high-quality experience. We find that rides who consistently rate trips with 5 stars 
request more rides and refer friends and family to try Uber. This leads to more trip 
requests and earning opportunities for driver-partners’ (Uber, 2016).  
The rating system thus, is used to whittle out any drivers that are deemed to be 
underperforming and subsequently reflecting negatively on the Uber brand. A respondent 
explained that there are specific behavioural cues that they employ to achieve high ratings, 
these are both physical cues and behavioural ones. Sthembiso explained that Uber demanded 
a lot of the driver’s participation in the trip experience:  
‘You have to make them [customers] feel comfortable. I have Valpre (bottled water) 
always. I offer clients and I have some few sweets also. I also ask for small things like 
if they like the temperature in the car or if they want to listen to 702 or Metro on the 
radio. These things can boost us in terms of ratings’. 
As Sthembiso remarked, he used beverages and sweets to increase the quality of the trip and 
improve his rating. Muzi explained how the rating system meant that certain conversational 
topics were to be left alone. He explained that:  
‘Sometimes I keep quiet in the beginning because you don’t want to aggravate 
customers that don’t want to talk. You must just wait and see and just hope. But I do 
talk to customers; I must keep it light, and most importantly professional. For 
example, if there was no rating system, you could punch me – matter of fact I would 
punch you back’ he jokingly explained.  
There seemed to be a level of sanitisation that the rating system made to driver partners and 
their behaviours. Uber’s constant surveillance through this rating system ensured that there 
would congruence between the driver’s behaviour and the service’s expectations. Hochschild, 
explains that ‘while emotion work happens within the private sphere, emotional labour is 
emotion management within workplace according to employer expectations’ (Hochschild, 
1983). This kind of management is one that is continuously ongoing in the Uber trip process. 
The threat of imminent termination from the service places drivers under behavioural 
constraints, concealing their inward emotions with elaborate actions of outward courtesy. 
Furthermore, as Michael explained:  
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‘You never know how customer will rate you, sometimes they just don’t like you for 
their own reasons’ ‘you can give the best service, or think you did, but then they still 
rate you badly. Some people just have agendas’ 
Michael illustrated that even in a situation where a driver feels as if he has issued exemplary 
service, a respective client may still give them a poor rating – explaining that their 
employment security is not necessarily always in their own hands. The rating apparatus 
within the Uber’s smartphone application, it is argued, is Uber’s most prominent panoptic 
mechanism. The service’s ‘rating’ system acts as an emotional straitjacket that limits and 
constrains a driver’s behaviour and actions. The reason for this heightened sense of constraint 
is that the rating system, acting as Foucault’s proverbial tower around a circular wall of Uber 
drivers, observes the movements, actions and conduct and uses these observations to retain or 
server labour. Furthermore, the rating system panopticon can be interpreted as having a 
heavier hand to Uber drivers. Senzo, when asked whether clients were also subject to the 
average rating system of potential termination, stated:  
‘They don’t suspend clients that much anymore. Now they just fine them. I think 
mostly if they throw up in the cars. You get these guys that throw up in the car after 
drinking on the weekends. I think they get fined R250 or something, if I report them. I 
have heard of some people fighting at the back of another guy’s car the one time, I 
think they [Uber] might have removed them’.  
What could be discerned from the responses given was that the service tended to fine clients 
for moderate to serious offenses, but there was no evidence that indicated that clients with 
lower than average ratings would face any form of termination. As a result, drivers can be 
seen operating under a reduced margin for error when it comes to their behaviour in 
comparison to their customer counterparts. As a result, the onus to act cordially during trips is 
solely on the shoulders of the driver. The following ethnographic vignette with respondent 
Muzi will illustrate the relationship that was observed between rating system and driver 
behaviour:  
 
‘I've only heard of one guy being fired from Uber’, Muzi explains when I questioned 
him about the nature of Uber’s rating system and its micro-management. ‘Apparently, 
he was driving like a taxi driver, but he was only working here for one week, a new 
guy’, he extends. Regarding dealing with difficult customers, Muzi stated: ‘you can't 
respond to difficult customer’s man, you must try and understand, some are rude of 
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course. But some drivers also have problems, like that guy’. He explained that driving 
for the service required a calmer set of emotions, and self-control when in the 
presence of customers who he perceived as difficult. He further noted that the 
emotional control spanned not only one’s outward behaviour but the manner of 
driving. He hurriedly avoided the plastic barricades put up for road renovations on 
Louis Botha Avenue as we shared laughter around the politics of South Africa’s 
men’s football team. His comfort enables a looser sense of driving and behaving, 
which often ranked below the mechanical emotional control and driving that Uber 
often lauds and advocated for. Muzi extrapolated a large part of the Uber ecosystem, 
one of emotional labour and the presentation of conservative driving habits. This 
requirement often collapsed when comfort was built between himself and myself as a 
customer in the process. For a temporary period, the smartphone-based rating was 
forgotten about, a rating system that would form part of Uber’s mechanism for 
evaluating drivers.  
 
In sum, the information panopticon that is Uber’s rating system is arguably designed more as 
a mechanism of evaluating and controlling driver partners than ensuring a balanced and 
cordial bilateral relationship between driver and customer respectively. The threat of 
termination and unemployment drastically influences driver behaviour and evokes emotional 
labour. The emotional labour is a reactionary mechanism utilised by drivers to combat the 
threat of employment insecurity. The threat of employment security as form of precarity is 
often coupled with the threat of workplace violence in the context of Uber. This violence, as 
will be argued in the next section, stems from Uber’s regulatory evasion and subsequent 
antagonist actions towards industry competitors. Work Security, which Standing defines as 
protection against accidents and illness at work through safety and health regulations, will be 
argued to recede as Uber disrupts the taxicab industry of Johannesburg. 
 
3.5. Uber’s Evasion of Taxi Industry Regulations 
 
Uber, providing a specialised product in the form of a sharing mechanism, is argued to gain 
inspiration from the central tenets of David Harvey’s flexible accumulation theory (Harvey, 
1990). This justification comes in the form of Uber stating that it provides a specialised 
platform from which drivers and customers can liaise and connect, thus not being an actual 
taxi service and not needing to abide to any form of taxicab regulation. This is argued to 
aggravate metered taxicab drivers operating in Johannesburg and thus placing Uber drivers in 
a precarious position when faced with the threat of violence from their metred counterparts. 
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Furthermore, it is argued that Uber’s evasion of regulation also places limitations on the 
income potentials of drivers as they must participate in fewer trips to preserve their safety. 
This argument mobilises existing literature from Akkaya (2015) and Hamari (2014) in 
describing the relationship between Uber and taxicab regulation coupled with the data 
ascertained from drivers to illuminate their lack of protection and work security.  
A respondent, Justice, when asked about his personal background, provided an interesting 
narrative around the potential perils of Uber’s evasion of regulation. He explained that 
metered taxicab drivers had grown angry over Uber’s presence in Johannesburg, with much 
of the anger directed toward Uber’s disruption and failure to adhere to the industry 
regulation. The following ethnographic vignette details Justice’s experience: 
 ‘I am originally from Bulawayo … I moved to Johannesburg around 2000’, Justice 
says with a subtle hush as he navigated the curvy bends around the suburb of 
Greenside. His tall, streaky psyche was intimidating to the naked eye, his voice on the 
other hand had a smooth sense of wavy articulation and familiarity. ‘I usually pick 
clients up around this area - sometimes Parktown North and Melrose … You can’t go 
to places like Yeoville man, they will throw things at your car and damage it. They 
[metered taxi drivers] don’t like Uber drivers, and if they see you’re Zimbabwean its 
worse’, he explained. The bulging occurrence of xenophobia-fuelled attacks of 
foreigners in South Africa in 2008 and 2014 seemed to have vilified his foreignness. 
‘They say that we are taking their clients away from them. I don’t understand this 
because I have heard clients tell me that it’s unsafe to use Roses [a common metered 
company in Johannesburg]. One guy stopped my car at Park station and asked for my 
papers. At first I thought he meant my documents because I am from Zimbabwe, but 
then he told me he wanted to see my permits. At the time we didn’t need permits as 
Uber – that’s what pissed them off’ 
Justice’s narrative highlighted a precarious facet of Uber business profile. His nationality 
when coupled with his line of work as an Uber driver combined both the frustrations from 
Uber’s competitors as well as xenophobes in the South Africa. Uber’s competitors, metered 
taxicab drivers, have grown angry with Uber’s growth in Johannesburg and other South 
African cities, pointing to the fact that Uber evades the regulatory legislation that presides 
over the taxicab industry in the country. This anger at Uber’s evasion of regulation as a 
result, has created health and safety concerns for drivers when operating in Uber’s on-
demand cruising network. A closer analysis of the relationship that Uber has with regulatory 
practices in Johannesburg and South Africa will illuminate how this relationship creates 
precarity through unsafe working conditions.  
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3.5.1. Contextualising Competitor Resistance to Uber’s Evasion of Regulation 
 
Uber’s infiltration of the taxicab industry in over 180 countries worldwide has seen it 
participate and inevitably displace existing competitors in those markets. An example of this 
phenomenon can be seen in San Francisco’s taxicab industry, with the average trips per 
month per cab falling from 1400 trips in March of 2012 to 500 trips in April of 2014. This 
decline is has coincided with Uber’s growing presence in the city (Akkaya, 2015). A similar 
state of affairs can be seen in New York’s famed yellow cab industry, with the price of a 
medallion falling from $1.32 million in 2013 to $650 thousand in august of 2015, a by-
produce of the dwindling demand for the yellow taxicabs in the city – also coinciding with 
Uber’s growing presence in the city (Stenovec, 2016). A multitude of reasons can be 
attributed to Uber’s rising presence in world cities, one could argue that the reduction of 
search costs and overall fare price has seen consumers drift toward the service, but one of the 
more compelling reasons is Uber’s apparent lack of regulation in a number markets in the 
world. The simplistic reasoning for this lack of regulation could be summed up in one basic 
statement; taxi regulation is aimed to regulate the supply of taxicabs in each city, Uber on the 
other hand, is not a taxicab supplier, so is thus devoid of any kind of regulation. In theory, 
applying taxi regulation on Uber would be akin to regulating service and appliance trading 
company Gumtree for the computers that consumers opt to lease or sell on its website. This is 
the logic that co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick holds. He claims that Uber is merely a 
smartphone application that helps people share, rather than a taxicab service (Hamari, 2014). 
This claim has helped Uber operate in several markets without being liable to various 
regulatory networks. The ramification of this has been an increased resistance from the 
sectors of the taxicab industry, who have systematically seen their own services and 
companies suffer from declining revenue and customers. Examples of this resistance and the 
premise thereof are apparent around the world. In Johannesburg, the metered taxi industry 
has reacted with violence and anger toward Uber’s penetration into their industry. The 
precarity created by the violent cultures permeating the taxicab industry in Johannesburg is 
accentuated in the next section.   
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3.5.2. Metered Taxicabs Violence: Implications  
 
The interface between metered taxis and Uber in Johannesburg is violence, which is argued 
to serve three functions. First, to stifle the link between Uber drivers and their customer base 
through various preventative measures aimed at halting drivers to pick up customers at 
certain key points. Secondly, violent protest action at structural institutions that aid or have a 
direct say in whether Uber operates in the city. And third, to physically threaten or physically 
harm drivers who operate with Uber.  
To elucidate the three functions of violence, one could turn to three distinct incidents as 
revealed by respondents and various media outlets. First, Phillip, explained how he had 
experienced physical barriers to reaching his clients. He explained;  
‘They [metered taxi drivers] blocked me off from going to the drop-off at Park Station 
– Park Station is quite bad man. My client wanted me to pick her up from inside the 
station but when I got there they put these orange cones to block me from going in’, 
‘who?’ I asked, ‘The metered guys’ Phillip explained. ‘They wanted to block me from 
getting a client, I could not drive into the station so in their mind this was stopping me 
from doing the pick-up’ 
Phillip revealed that Gautrain stations were places where these kinds of incidents were 
especially rife. ‘At Park Station [within Johannesburg’s CBD] things always happen man’ he 
explained that Metered taxis saw these Gautrain stations as one of their last reservoir of 
customers – commuters such as business people from Sandton and the Airport. Phillip 
explained that after much effort, he had to call the client to arrange an alternative meeting 
place a few blocks north of the station. Another respondent explained that cones were not the 
only form of barrier used to halt the activities of Uber drivers. Sthembiso corroborated 
Phillip’s assertion; 
‘They will block you off with their cars and tell you to turn around. If you try to drive 
somewhere they don’t you to be, they will block you with their cars. I have heard 
some other Uber guys being stopped with guns and sjamboks. The situation is tense 
between us and them’ 
The implications of these blockages lead to trip cancellations by the Uber drivers in question, 
which too could lead to termination by the service as driver can only cancel as a minimal 
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number of trips before being removed from the service. This reduced their opportunities at 
increasing their wage levels along with reducing their work security and increasing 
workplace precarity. The metered taxi war on Uber has been operationalised through more 
mechanisms than just barricading entry into key points. Physical acts of violence have also 
sparked throughout the city, as Uber drivers have faced threats and incidents of harm. 
Michael explained how he had metered taxi drivers remove the key from his ignition and 
threaten him with a fire arm, alluding to other scenes has been witness to, such as a driver 
being killed by an armed gunman while he was in his vehicle.  
‘You just can’t go to certain places, man. If I see a trip requested from places like 
Rockey Street – I cancel immediately, even sometimes Hillbrow on some streets. I’ve 
seen rocks being thrown at someone’s windshield, he didn’t even stop, he just kept 
driving with the broken windows’  
The situation is seemingly dire in this respect, with little intervention from Johannesburg’s 
Metro Police Department. In response, Alon Lits, Uber’s sub-Saharan Africa general 
manager, in an interview with the media, acknowledged that the violence was in continuous 
escalation, ‘we are in constant communication with the drivers assuring them that their safety 
is our number one priority. We’re considering ways to reduce cases of intimidation’ (Corke, 
2015).  
In reflection of responses, Drivers have had to take initiative in ensuring their own protection 
primarily resorting to trip avoidance to maintain a distance between themselves and centres 
of violence. This kind of trip-avoidance, and trip cancellation because of the threat of 
violence contradicts Uber’s general policies. As stated earlier, and confirmed by respondents, 
if one cancels (which is done after accepting a requested trip) or rejects (Declining a client’s 
trip request) too many trips, he or she can be terminated from using the service. This as a 
result further accentuates their precarity, decreasing their employment security (ability to 
retain employment) and job security (protection against wrongful or arbitrary dismissal).  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has detailed four principle observations that contribute towards the broader 
argument related to the precarity that Uber creates for its drivers. First, dynamic pricing has 
been revealed to have the dual outcome of decreasing driver incomes and increasing the 
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density of work hours experienced by drivers. This has been argued to create decreased 
labour market security as relating to Standing’s theory of precarity (Standing, 2011). Second, 
Drivers have been argued to suffer from employment insecurity as a result of a 
misclassification of their employment stemming from Uber’s informalisation of labour and 
the proliferation of third-party fleet owners. This informalisation of labour, has been 
interpreted using David Harvey’s flexible accumulation theory that describes labour 
informalisation as being a hallmark of a new capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 1990). In 
the third instance, Uber drivers have been argued to suffer from decreased levels of 
employment security due to company’s rating system, which serves as a mechanism from 
which to evaluate driver’s performance. This insecurity, administered through Uber’s 
information panopticon, has been interpreted to cause the symptom of emotional labour in 
drivers (Hochschild, 1983). In final instance, Uber’s reluctance to abide to taxicab regulation 
in Johannesburg, has been argued to stifle driver income potential as well create an unsafe 
working environment due to the threat of violence from industry competitors.  
 
These four strands of precarity, as will be illustrated in the conclusion chapter, generate 
increased knowledge on the precarity of Uber drivers while they operate with the Uber 
service. 
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Chapter 4 – Uber’s Precarious Labour Conditions: Final Reflections 
 
 
The research process has unearthed multiple findings related to Uber’s effect on Labour in 
Johannesburg, which can be interpreted as an implication of the sharing economy’s broader 
penetration of the city and region. The structure of the study has sought to answer three 
supporting questions with the purpose of giving clarity to the broader enquiry on how the 
labour conditions created by ride-sharing service Uber affects drivers operating in the taxicab 
industry in Johannesburg, South Africa.  The primary argument in this regard is that Uber’s 
labour conditions result in drivers being placed in a position of precarity. This is justified 
through six principle observations 
 
Uber is a disruptive technology that has gained momentum in a unique socioeconomic system 
that has proliferated around the globe since the early 1990s. This socioeconomic system, 
largely characterised by the sharing of products and services on peer-based platforms, can be 
defined as the sharing economy (Hamari, 2014). The sharing economy can be traced to two 
prevailing global trends. First, the rise of a ‘network society’ characterised by the 
proliferation of technology as a means of communication and interconnection in society 
(Castells & Cardoso, 2005). And second, the emergence of a new form of capitalist 
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production defined as flexible accumulation has given impetus to disruptive platforms such 
as Uber (Harvey, 1990).  
 
The sharing economy, with its roots in flexible accumulation, has created a climate of 
informalised labour, which is seen directly in Uber’s drivers being classified as ‘independent 
contractors’ as opposed to employees (Uber, 2016). Within the context of Johannesburg as a 
site in which the sharing economy and Uber has penetrated, this study has illustrated that this 
classification is in some cases not valid due to some drivers operating through third-party 
vehicle owners in the city. The implication of this is that drivers become de facto employees 
according to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of South Africa (BCEA, 1997). 
Consequently, it is argued that Uber drivers suffer from compromised levels of employment 
security and limitations on income progress because of sharing earnings with vehicle owners 
and Uber (Standing, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the proliferation of information technology has seen organisations such as Uber 
utilise disruptive technologies as information panopticons with the capacity to change the 
nature of production based on current supply and demand trends (Zuboff, 1988). Uber utilises 
an information panopticons in the form of a smartphone-based application. This smartphone 
application operates within the sharing economy aided by connectivity to the Internet and in 
particular the web 2.0 (Berners-Lee, 1996). 
 
It is argued that Uber’s smartphone application serves the function of changing the nature of 
production based current supply and demand trend. This change according to current supply 
and demand trends can be directly interpreted through Uber’s use of ‘dynamic pricing’ which 
changes trip fares on the whims of current Uber supply and demand conditions. This study 
has concluded that Uber’s dynamic pricing increases driver work hours and decreases the 
general income of drivers. As a result, an increased driver income insecurity was observed, 
which is the inability to ensure a stable income and income generating opportunities.   
 
Uber’s smartphone-based application is also argued to enact panopticism in the realm of 
surveying and evaluating driver performance according to specific control rules. This can be 
directly seen in Uber’s use of a customer-issued rating system for drivers, which requires 
Uber drivers to maintain an average of 4.7 or higher out 5. The study has observed that this 
rating system places drivers in a precarious position characterised by decreased employment 
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security. This is due to the risk of dismissal for poor ratings. As a symptom, Uber drivers 
react to the precariousness created through the rating e-management system by exhibiting 
emotional labour, a process in which drivers manage their feelings to calibrate with those 
required in Uber’s 4.7 star control rule (Hochschild, 1983).  
 
In sum, Uber’s business model, while achieving higher levels of success in western markets, 
has in effect broadened the scope of precarious work in some areas of the south, particularly 
in Johannesburg, South Africa. The presence of fleet owners has a distortionary effect on the 
material circumstances of Uber drivers, along with destabilising their conditions of 
employment. The effect on the material circumstances of drivers is illuminated when one 
compares the income generation that Uber’s business model affords self-employed drivers 
with the decreased rate afforded to drivers who drive for fleet owners. The unique presence 
of fleet owners in the Uber landscape of Johannesburg can be described as a by-product of 
the decreased rate of private vehicle ownership and lack of access to vehicle finance for 
drivers in areas that are economically less lucrative, such as in the global south. Uber’s 
implicit failure to account for an operational loophole such as fleet-ownership has increased 
the labour market insecurity for drivers in comparison to the increased autonomy they are 
entitled to in Uber’s business model. Uber’s drivers in Johannesburg engage with Uber’s ‘Be 
Your Own Boss’ mantra through the illusion that they are in control of their labour, while 
they are far from being the ‘independent contractors’ that Uber purports. The argument thus 
distils itself in two interlinked processes. Firstly, Uber’s penetration of a global south market 
such as Johannesburg means that they are faced with a labour pool that has a decreased 
material capacity to own their own means of production – which is in stark contrast to their 
counterparts in the developing world. Secondly, the lack of private ownership of vehicles by 
drivers creates the conditions for the emergence of fleet owners, who use their own monopoly 
on capital to purchase several private vehicles and tether those vehicles with willing drivers 
who then in turn enter the Uber ecosystems as independent contractors. As illustrated 
previously, these drivers inherit employee benefits once they become employed by fleet 
owners, which benefits that are lost when Uber misclassifies them as independent 
contractors. A new form of precarity is introduced into an industry that is already less secure 
in Johannesburg than it is in developed world.  
 
It thus becomes imperative for Uber drivers to be classified correctly by the service in 
relation to their employee status. This would entail creating a distinction between a ‘driver’ 
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and a ‘driver-partner’, with the former classified as an employee of the latter. A result of 
which would bring more bargaining power to drivers when negotiating terms of employment 
with their fleet owners. Additionally, periods of price-cutting by Uber may achieve a higher 
level of stability for drivers if they are ensured the same fare-price they are accustomed to 
during periods of price cutting, with Uber carrying the potential burden for unintended 
consequences such the customer demand not meeting the supply of drivers even in periods of 
lower fare-prices.  
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